| Keyword |
Date: Filed /
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
|UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
|| No. 99-4240|
|JULIE ANN DOBBS,
|| (D.C. No. 99-CR-284-W)
ORDER AND JUDGMENT(*)
Before TACHA, McKAY, and HENRY,
This appeal from a conviction and sentence for possession of stolen mail
raises only sentencing issues. The Defendant first appeals the trial court's
inclusion of all relevant conduct at sentencing. At trial, two checks were
introduced into evidence which had been stolen from the mail, together with
evidence that Defendant presented them to a business for services and that she
filled in the name of the business and the amount tendered in her own
handwriting. At sentencing, the trial court included as relevant conduct fourteen
additional checks from the stolen series of blanks. There was no evidence that
Defendant negotiated those checks, but there was evidence before the court at
sentencing that the handwriting on the additional checks was similar to that on the
checks Defendant passed. (Appellee's App. at 62). There was additional
testimony that Defendant was with a Ms. Spinuzzi (who testified that she gave
some of the checks to Defendant) when Ms. Spinuzzi passed some of the checks.
The handwriting and other evidence were sufficient to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that Defendant was involved in the passing of at
least seventeen checks, whose value exceeded the $2,000 that the court used in
The second issue on appeal concerns the court's two-level offense increase
for more than minimal planning. The number of checks, the elaborate ruses
Defendant used to explain her right to the checks she passed, and the apparent
coordination between Defendant and Ms. Spinuzzi more than satisfied the
necessary support for this conclusion. We have held that more than minimal
planning exists where "there are repeated acts over a period of time, unless it is
clear that each instance is purely opportune." United States v. Copus, 110 F.3d
1529, 1537 (10th Cir. 1997).
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Click footnote number to return to corresponding location in the text.
*.This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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Date: Filed /
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