UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, |
|
On November 11, 1996, United States Border Patrol Agent James Scott stopped at several motels in Las Cruces, New Mexico to look for suspicious vehicles that he believed could be harboring contraband or undocumented aliens. At the Western Inn motel, Agent Scott observed a male driver and a female passenger exit a brown 1977 Chevrolet pickup truck and walk toward the motel. Agent Scott conducted a canine inspection on the truck. The dog immediately alerted to the area between the cab and the bed. Several agents inspected the vehicle and discovered evidence they considered to be consistent with false compartments in the bed of the truck.
The agents observed a man later identified as Francisco Castaneda-Lopez standing barefoot in the breezeway of the motel. The agents thought he appeared surprised and fearful. After questioning Mr. Castaneda-Lopez, the agents determined he was an illegal alien and detained him. The agents escorted Mr. Castaneda-Lopez to his motel room to retrieve his shoes and discovered Bernardo Hernandez-Castillo and Priscilla Delgado fully clothed in bed. Agent Scott noticed a set of keys on the motel room dresser he believed were the keys to the brown pickup truck. Agent Scott unequivocally asked all the occupants of the room whom the keys belonged to. Mr. Hernandez-Castillo did not respond until Ms. Delgado indicated that he had been the driver of the truck. He reluctantly provided an additional ignition key to the truck that he stored in his wallet wrapped in layers of tissue paper. Mr. Hernandez-Castillo was taken into custody and the truck was seized. At that time, Mr. Hernandez-Castillo admitted that he was the owner of the truck, and he indicated that he had purchased it two weeks earlier from Mr. Castaneda-Lopez.
Pursuant to a vehicle search, agents subsequently uncovered approximately 122 pounds of marijuana concealed in false compartments inside the wheel wells and front bed of the truck. Mr. Hernandez-Castillo and Mr. Castaneda-Lopez, were indicted on November 11, 1996. They were tried together before a jury. At trial, Mr. Hernandez-Castillo admitted ownership of the truck, but denied knowledge that marijuana was concealed therein. At the conclusion of the government's case, both defendants moved for judgments of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). The trial court granted Mr. Castaneda-Lopez's motion, but denied Mr. Hernandez-Castillo's motion. After all evidence was presented, the jury found Mr. Hernandez-Castillo guilty.
Mr. Hernandez-Castillo appeals on two grounds. He contends the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury's finding that he possessed marijuana with intent to distribute. He also argues that the district court erred by not declaring a mistrial after it dismissed the case against Mr. Castaneda-Lopez, while allowing the same jury to decide the case against Mr. Hernandez-Castillo. With regard to each challenge, we affirm the district court.
In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's
verdict, this court reviews the record de novo. See, e.g., United States
v. Wilson,
107 F.3d 774, 778 (10th Cir. 1997). Evidence sufficiently supports a verdict if,
when considered in the light most favorable to the government, it would allow a
reasonable juror to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See
id.
In evaluating the evidence under this standard, the court will not question a
jury's credibility determinations or its conclusions about the weight of the
evidence. See United States v. Johnson, 57 F.3d 968, 971 (10th Cir.
1995).
To obtain a conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute
under 21 U.S.C. § 841, the government must prove that Mr. Hernandez-Castillo
(1) possessed a controlled substance, (2) knew he possessed a controlled
substance, and (3) intended to distribute the controlled substance. See United
States v. Mains, 33 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 1994). With regard to the first
element, the statute does not require a defendant to have had actual possession of
the marijuana; constructive possession is sufficient. See id. An individual has
constructive possession over an object when he or she knowingly has exclusive
ownership, dominion, or control over the object or the premises where the object
is found. See United States v. Taylor, 113 F.3d 1136, 1144-45 (10th Cir.
1997).
Here, there is no question that Mr. Hernandez-Castillo exclusively owned the
truck in which the narcotics were found. He admitted such at trial. Thus, the
first element is satisfied.
The second element--whether the defendant knew he possessed a
controlled substance--is disputed by the parties. Mr. Hernandez-Castillo urges
us to adopt the Fifth Circuit's approach of looking for additional factors
indicating knowledge in cases in which contraband is discovered in hidden
compartments within a vehicle. See United States v. Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d 907,
911 (5th Cir. 1995). It is unnecessary, however, for us to decide whether to
follow the Fifth Circuit approach. In reviewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, we find sufficient evidence from which a reasonable
jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt even if we
were to require additional evidence indicating knowledge of possession.
First, we look at Mr. Hernandez-Castillo's connection to the truck. He
testified that he drove the truck every day he had work. Two cans of plumbing
sealant, used to line the false compartments, were found in the truck. Finally,
Agent Scott testified that Ms. Delgado identified Mr. Hernandez-Castillo as the
driver of the truck.
Next, we look at the evidence of Mr. Hernandez-Castillo's hesitant
behavior as described by Agent Scott. Mr. Hernandez-Castillo was reluctant to
claim ownership of the truck and to produce its keys. This allows a reasonable
juror to infer guilty knowledge that defendant possessed contraband. A jury's
reasonable inference of Mr. Hernandez-Castillo's knowledge is further supported
by the evidence presented by the government showing that the marijuana was
reasonably fresh and that the addition of the false compartments were recent.
This evidence would allow a reasonable juror to discount the defense's theory
that both the false compartments and the contraband concealed therein were in
place prior to the defendant's taking possession of the truck. The circumstantial
evidence similarly permitted the jury to draw a reasonable inference that Mr.
Hernandez-Castillo was at the motel, in an area with high levels of drug and alien
smuggling activity, in order to wait for an opportunity to cross the border
checkpoints when they were closed.
Furthermore, the defendant admitted on cross-examination lying to border
patrol agents on two occasions, the first when he initially denied ownership of
the truck, and the second when he gave them a false address for his claimed
residence in the United States. In light of the totality of evidence, we conclude
there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant knew he possessed
a controlled substance.
On the third element of a section 841 case--intent to distribute the
controlled substance--Mr. Hernandez-Castillo does not assert that the evidence
was insufficient to demonstrate intent. Thus, in evaluating the evidence under
the three-part standard, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to support a
conviction against defendant for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.
II. Right to a Fair Trial
Mr. Hernandez-Castillo argues that the district court prejudiced the case
against him and violated his constitutional rights to due process and a fair and
impartial trial by failing to declare a mistrial after dismissing the case against Mr.
Castaneda-Lopez. Mr. Hernandez-Castillo did not move for a mistrial below nor
object at any time to the continuation of the trial, thus we simply review for plain
error. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1985). Accordingly, our
review is limited to determining whether the district court's decision not to sua
sponte declare a mistrial so prejudiced the case against the defendant and
impinged on the fundamental fairness of the trial process, see id. at 16, that, in
view of all the circumstances, the defendant must be deemed to have been
deprived of his Fifth Amendment due process or Sixth Amendment impartial jury
guarantees. Under this standard, there was clearly no plain error here. The
district court properly instructed the jury not to draw any conclusions from the
dismissal of the case against Mr. Hernandez-Castillo's co-defendant. Such
curative instructions were sufficient here to protect the defendant from prejudice
amounting to plain error.
Based upon the foregoing conclusions, we find that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain the conviction, and we also find that the district court did not
plainly err in not declaring a mistrial. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the
district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
*.This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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