Defendant-Appellant, Mr. Stephen Wilson, was charged with conspiracy to
manufacture marijuana; manufacturing and possession with the intent to
distribute marijuana; maintenance of a facility to facilitate manufacture and
distribution of marijuana; criminal forfeiture; aiding and abetting; and possession
of false identification documents. Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress evidence
obtained in three separate searches, alleging that the evidence was seized in
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Defendant's motion was granted in
part and denied in part. See R., Vol. I, Doc. 38 at 18. Defendant then entered
into a plea agreement which provided that he plead guilty to the manufacture of
marijuana by production, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(B), and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. Also
pursuant to the plea agreement, the other charges against Defendant were
dismissed. See R., Vol. I, Doc. 65: Appellee's Br. at 2. The district court
sentenced Defendant to sixty months imprisonment.
Defendant appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress
evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant.(1) He contends that the warrant was
obtained through the use of an affidavit which contained false and misleading
statements. Defendant argues that the court erred in concluding that the warrant
contained probable cause to search after several false and misleading statements
were redacted from the affidavit. See Appellant's Br. at 1. Defendant also
appeals the district court's refusal to apply U.S. Sentencing Guideline [U.S.S.G.]
§ 5C1.2 to his sentence even though the presentence report indicated that
Defendant met the criteria for this adjustment. See R., Vol. II at 12-13.
We review the district court's determination that a defendant is not eligible
for a sentence reduction pursuant to section 5C1.2 for clear error. See United
States v. Roman-Zarate, 115 F.3d 778, 784 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Acosta-Olivas, 71 F.3d 375, 378 n.3 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Adu, 82
F.3d 119, 124 (6th Cir. 1996). "'We believe that the district court's
determination that a defendant is not eligible for the reduction permitted by
sec[tion] 5C1.2 ought to be governed by the clearly erroneous standard. The
court's determination . . . will often depend on credibility determinations that
cannot be replicated with the same accuracy on appeal.'" Acosta-Olivas, 71 F.3d
at 378 n.3 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 69 F.3d 136, 144 (7th Cir.
1995)). The district court's decision in this case was based on Defendant's
credibility. See R., Vol. I, Doc. 65 at 5 ("The Court finds the defendant did not
provide truthful information concerning the offense to the Government before the
time of the sentencing hearing."). The court's determination that Defendant was
not volunteering the complete truth about his acts is supported by evidence in the
record. See id., Vol. I, Doc. 63 at Ex. B (Defendant's statement avowing that
all
of the marijuana found was intended for personal use for himself, his brother,
and his father; and that the false documentation found in his possession was to
obtain rental property); Vol. VIII at 7 (Defendant stipulates to quantity of 800
plants). We hold that the decision to refuse Defendant this adjustment to his
sentence was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. White, 119 F.3d 70,
74
(1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Wilson, 114 F.3d 429, 432 (4th Cir. 1997);
Adu,
82 F.3d at 124-25.
"We must review [a] magistrate's finding of probable cause to issue [a]
search warrant with 'great deference.'" United States v. Orr, 864 F.2d 1505,
1508 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)). "We
do not review a magistrate's determination of probable cause de novo; we decide
whether the evidence viewed as a whole provided a substantial basis for the
Magistrate's finding." United States v. Richardson, 86 F.3d 1537, 1545 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 117 S. Ct. 588 (1996) (internal quotations
omitted); see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 236-37; United States v.
Mills, 29 F.3d 545,
547 (10th Cir. 1994). The substantial basis test is satisfied if "there is a fair
probability that evidence of a crime will be found" during the search. United
States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 382 (10th Cir. 1986); see also
Gates, 462 U.S. at
236. When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government. See United States v.
Villa-Chaparro, 115 F.3d 797, 800-01 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ , 118
S.
Ct. 326 (1997); United States v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1063 (10th Cir.
1997).
Defendant contends that after the false statements were redacted from the
affidavit supporting the warrant and the affidavit's omissions of fact were
corrected there was insufficient evidence of probable cause to issue the warrant.
If a defendant establishes that false statements included in an affidavit supporting
a search warrant were made knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth,
and that the false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause, the
evidence seized during the resultant search must be excluded to the same extent
that exclusion is warranted when probable cause is lacking on the face of the
affidavit. See United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1997)
(citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)). Additionally, this
court has held "that the standards of 'deliberate falsehood' and 'reckless
disregard' set forth in Franks apply 'to material omissions, as well as affirmative
falsehoods.'" Kennedy, 131 F.3d at 1376 (quoting Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d
572, 582 (10th Cir. 1990)). However, to be granted a motion to suppress
pursuant to the holding in Franks, the defendant must prove that the affidavit at
issue "cannot support a finding of probable cause without the allegedly false
information." United States v. Valencia, 24 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1994);
see
United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992); Stewart, 915
F.2d at 582.
We agree with the district court that the corrected affidavit was sufficient
for the magistrate judge to find probable cause to issue a search warrant. See R.,
Vol. I, Doc. 38 at 2-10. The affiant's statement that during an aerial flyover he
viewed marijuana plants on land where Defendant resided and the other
statements in the affidavit that Defendant exhibited behavior consistent with
those involved in the production of marijuana established a fair probability that a
crime was being committed and support a finding of probable cause. See United
States v. Emmons, 24 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that discovery
of large quantities of marijuana on the defendant's property was enough to
support finding of probable cause); Morehead, 959 F.2d at 1498 (holding that
"officers' observations of marijuana plants in the trailer and shop building
adjacent to the [defendant's] residence" provided a substantial basis for the
conclusion that there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be
found); Mason v. United States, 719 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding
that report of suspicious activity, defendants acting nervously, and the discovery
of drug paraphernalia in the defendants' rooms established probable cause);
United States v. Ramos, 923 F.2d 1346, 1351 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Probable cause to
justify a search warrant exists when there is a sufficient showing that
incriminating items are located on the property to which entry is sought.").
Defendant's claim that the warrant was issued without probable cause
because it failed to state that his common-law wife was the owner of the real
property to be searched is not valid. The district court noted that attachments to
the warrant included the county records noting the owner of the property. See R.,
Vol. I, Doc. 38 at 7; see also id., Doc. 7 at Ex. 1. Therefore, any
"omission" of
this information in the affidavit supporting the warrant or the warrant itself is
immaterial because the issuing magistrate judge had that information at the time
that he signed the warrant.(2)
We find no error in the district court's conclusions of law or fact.
Therefore, Defendant's conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
*. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1.Because we find Appellant's Pro-Se
Supplemental Brief redundant and
unnecessary, we deny both his Motion for Leave to File a Pro-Se Supplemental Brief and
his Motion for Leave to File Corrections in his Supplemental Brief. We have reviewed
Appellant's Motion for Substitution of Counsel Due to Ineffective Assistance and find it
to be without merit. Because we have considered and disposed of the issue Appellant
complains his counsel has not raised, we deny Appellant's Motion for Substitution of
Counsel.
2.We also note that the warrant satisfied
Oklahoma law. See 22 Okla. Stat. § 1223;
Bauwens v. State, 657 P.2d 176, 178 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); Doyle v. State,
320 P.2d
727, 729 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958); Cook v. State, 132 P.2d 349, 350-51 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1942).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STEPHEN W. WILSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Before ANDERSON, McKAY, and
LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case
is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Click footnote number to return to corresponding location in the text.
| Keyword |
Case |
Docket |
Date: Filed /
Added |
(24975 bytes)
(17371 bytes)
Comments to: WebMaster,
ca10 [at] washburnlaw.edu.
Updated: August 13, 1998.
HTML markup © 1998, Washburn University School of Law.
URL: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/1998/08/97-5201.htm.