FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

AUG 2 1999

PATRICK FISHER
Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

SHEILA BARNES,

		Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, Social Security Administration,

		Defendant-Appellee.	

No. 98-5156
(D.C. No. 97-CV-514-M)
(N.D. Okla.)	

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before ANDERSON and KELLY, Circuit Judges, and BROWN,** Senior District Judge.

	After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument.  See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).  The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
	Claimant Sheila Barnes appeals from the district court’s order affirming the Social Security Administration’s denial of disability benefits.  Claimant filed an application for disability benefits in 1994 with an alleged disability date of December 14, 1993.  Her application was denied initially and again upon reconsideration.  After a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found claimant not disabled and denied benefits.  The Appeals Council denied her request for review.  Claimant filed a complaint in federal district court.  That court affirmed the agency’s denial of benefits.  
	Our jurisdiction arises under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the agency’s decision to determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record viewed as a whole and whether the agency applied correct legal standards.  See Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994).  On appeal, claimant contends that the ALJ ignored record medical evidence, improperly discounted the credibility of her testimony at the hearing, and failed to properly apply correct legal standards in evaluating her allegations of pain.  We agree, and remand this case to the agency for further proceedings.  

	The common basis for appellant’s challenges to the agency’s ruling is the ALJ’s apparent decision not to consider claimant’s medical records predating her alleged disability date.  This decision is indicated by the ALJ’s statements that claimant “complained of headaches only once in the medical evidence,” and that no objective medical evidence demonstrated a problem with leg pain.  Appellant’s App. at 22.  As claimant notes in her brief, however, her history of back and leg pain, headaches, and corresponding treatment is well documented in the medical record.  While we acknowledge that there is little medical evidence after the alleged disability date, the medical evidence prior to that time is clearly relevant to the impairments and pain that claimant is now alleging.  See Gardner v. Brian, 369 F.2d 443, 447 (10th Cir. 1966).  The ALJ may not simply ignore that medical evidence and then base his rejection of claimant’s allegations on a lack of relevant evidence.  
	Further, the ALJ compounded this error by discounting claimant’s credibility based on the supposed lack of medical evidence corroborating her complaints.  Her testimony at the hearing about her back and leg pain and headaches was consistent with her complaints in the medical evidence predating her alleged disability date.  Because that evidence is relevant, the ALJ’s failure to consider it undermines his decision regarding claimant’s credibility.  See Huston, 838 F.2d at 1133.  
	The ALJ also found claimant’s testimony about her pain not credible based on his observation that claimant has not regularly sought treatment for headaches or back pain since her alleged disability date.  His opinion states that this failure is inconsistent with the amount of pain alleged, but does not mention claimant’s testimony at the hearing that she could not afford to go to a doctor regularly or to have her medication prescriptions filled.  See Appellant’s App. at 56-57.  This failure to consider claimant’s testimony also undermines his credibility determination.  See Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1490 (10th Cir. 1993). 
	We also agree with claimant that the ALJ improperly applied the classic pain analysis set forth in Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1987).  Therein, this court rejected the argument that disabling pain must be demonstrated by the severity of the impairment involved.  Instead, we concluded that disability claimants must demonstrate only a “loose nexus” between the pain alleged and the medically determinable impairment.  Id. at 164.  “Accordingly, if an impairment is reasonably expected to produce some pain, allegations of disabling pain emanating from that impairment are sufficiently consistent to require consideration of all relevant evidence.”  Id.  Here, in considering claimant’s allegations of back pain, the ALJ not only failed to consider all of the relevant evidence, as noted above, he also relied on the severity of the impairment involved to reject claimant’s allegations.  The medical evidence shows that claimant suffered from a ruptured disk and subsequent lumbar strain.  The ALJ stressed that X-rays showed only mild degenerative disk disease and that an MRI showed only a slight bulge at L5-S1.  See Appellant’s App. at 20.  He concluded that there was only “a minimal basis for pain,” id. at 22, and that her diagnosis of lumbar strain “is consistent with only mild back pain, not disabling pain,” id. at 23.  This is exactly the sort of analysis that Luna rejected.  The ALJ should have considered all of the relevant evidence regarding claimant’s allegations of pain instead of relying almost exclusively on the medical record.  Further, although the ALJ did recite some of the factors set out in Luna in connection with claimant’s allegations of disabling pain, he failed to link those factors with medical evidence on the record.  See Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995).  
	Finally, claimant also argues that the ALJ posed an incorrect hypothetical to the vocational expert (VE), and ignored VE testimony favorable to her.  We need not reach this issue, given our decision to reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.  We do note, however, that the ALJ’s failure to consider all of the medical evidence relevant to claimant’s allegations also allowed him to ignore the VE’s testimony at the hearing that if claimant suffered headaches to the extent alleged–and we also note that her testimony was consistent with the medical evidence predating her alleged disability date–she would be unable to maintain employment because of absenteeism from work.  See Appellant’s App. at 64-65.  
	The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED to the district court with direction to REMAND to the agency for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.

				Entered for the Court

				Wesley E. Brown
				Senior District Judge