FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

FEB 7 2000

PATRICK FISHER
Clerk

	UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

ORVAL W. TAYLOR,

		Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

STEVE HARGETT,

		Respondent-Appellee.	

No.  99-6102
(D.C. No. 97-CV-642-R)
(W.D. Okla.)	

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before BALDOCK, HENRY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

	After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument.  See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).  The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.  
	Orval Wayne Taylor, an Oklahoma state prisoner, seeks a certificate of appealability to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition.  As Taylor has failed to make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

BACKGROUND

	Initially, Taylor was serving his twenty-year sentence at the Dick Conner Correctional Center, where he participated in a work program, earned work-time credits,  see Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, § 138, and was eligible for emergency-cap credits, see id., § 573.  He was then charged with misconduct for conspiring to introduce illegal contraband into the Center.  After disciplinary proceedings, he was transferred to the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, a higher security facility.  There, he was not eligible for either work-time or emergency-cap credits.  
	In his habeas petition, Taylor asserted that the disciplinary proceeding and its consequences violated his due process rights.  He also claimed that his parole eligibility was affected because he was not permitted to appear in person before the board.  The district court concluded that Taylor had not been deprived of a liberty or property interest and therefore had not demonstrated a due process violation.  The court dismissed the petition and denied a certificate of appealability.

DISCUSSION

	There is no independent constitutional liberty interest in a state’s good-time credit scheme, see Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), or in prison employment, see Ingram v. Papalia, 804 F.2d 595, 596 (10th Cir. 1986).  Further, the Oklahoma statutes governing inmate credits do not guarantee that inmates will receive an opportunity to work, work-time credits, or emergency cap credits.  See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, §§ 138, 224, 571-74; see also Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 357 (10th Cir. 1978) (stating that Oklahoma law does not create a protected right to work-time credits).  Thus, no constitutional right is implicated by Taylor’s transfer from an institution offering such opportunities to one that does not.  See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229 (1976).   We decline Taylor’s invitation to ignore Supreme Court precedent and overturn settled Tenth Circuit case law. 
	Taylor’s argument concerning the effect of the transfer on his parole eligibility is also faulty.  He alleges that inmates at the penitentiary, unlike those at the Dick Conner Correctional Center, are not permitted to make a personal appearance before the Pardon and Parole Board and speculates that a lack of personal contact led to denial of his parole.  “Oklahoma’s constitution creates a right to seek clemency before the Pardon and Parole Board,”  Duvall v. Keating, 162 F.3d 1058, 1060 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 633 (1998), but does not create a liberty interest in obtaining parole, see Shirley v. Chestnut, 603 F.2d 805, 807 (10th Cir. 1979).  Taylor, who received “jacket review” by the parole board, was not deprived of any right entitling him to due process protections.  

	Taylor’s application for a certificate of appealability is DENIED and his appeal is DISMISSED.  	  

				ENTERED FOR THE COURT
				PER CURIAM