UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

__________________________

RODNEY JAROME BROADES,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

GARY GIBSON, Warden, O.S.P.,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 00-7062

(E.D. Okla.)

(D.Ct. No. 99-CV-302-B)
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before BRORBY, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Appellant Rodney Jarome Broades, a state inmate appearing pro se, appeals the district court's decision denying his federal habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We deny Mr. Broades' request for a certificate of appealability and dismiss his appeal.

In his § 2254 petition, Mr. Broades challenged his state sentence for robbery by firearm, after former conviction of two or more felonies. The district court issued an Order denying Mr. Broades' petition as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). In making this determination, the district court applied the mail box rule and the one-year limitation period for bringing a § 2254 action, as well as tolled the one-year limitation period during the pendency of Mr. Broades' direct appeal and first state post-conviction application. The district court further determined no additional tolling occurred during the pendency of Mr. Broades' "Motion for [Order] Nunc Pro Tunc" and second post-conviction habeas petition in which he claimed the state incorrectly enhanced his conviction with prior underlying convictions. In addressing Mr. Broades' "Motion for [Order] Nunc Pro Tunc" and second state post-conviction petition, the district court noted the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found the issue he presented barred by the doctrine of res judicata. It also found the motion barred under Oklahoma law that requires any challenge to a conviction and sentence be brought pursuant to Oklahoma's Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

On appeal, Mr. Broades continues to claim his "Motion for [Order] Nunc Pro Tunc" and second state post-conviction petition should toll his limitation period under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2). We review de novo the legal basis for the district court's dismissal of Mr. Broades' § 2254 petition. See Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1453 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1235 (1996). In so doing, we afford deference to the state court's construction of state law. See James v. Gibson, 211 F.3d 543, 549 (10th Cir. 2000).

Applying this standard, we have carefully reviewed the record on appeal, Mr. Broades' brief, and the district court's order. We hold Mr. Broades untimely filed his federal habeas petition. In so holding, we are convinced Mr. Broades' "Motion for [Order] Nunc Pro Tunc" and second state post-conviction petition may not toll the limitation period under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2), for the reasons discussed below.

First, it is important to note that in considering Mr. Broades' "Motion for [Order] Nunc Pro Tunc," the state district court issued an order clarifying it enhanced Mr. Broades' sentence on the basis of at least two prior convictions. Moreover, in addressing this same issue on appeal, on rehearing, in the second state post-conviction petition, and in various other pleadings filed by Mr. Broades, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals clearly found Mr. Broades' claim barred under the doctrine of res judicata.1 We have stated that "[g]enerally, where 'a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner' can satisfy either the 'cause and prejudice' standard, or, alternatively, the 'fundamental miscarriage of justice standard.'" Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1096 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1025 (1999) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)). "For this procedural default doctrine to apply, the state law ground must have been 'the exclusive basis for the state court's holding' and 'strictly or regularly followed' by the state courts and applied 'evenhandedly to all similar claims.'" Id. (quoting Maes v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 979, 985 (10th Cir. 1995)). Applying this criteria, we note the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has consistently held "[t]he doctrine of res judicata bars consideration in post- conviction proceedings of issues which have been, or which could have been, raised on direct appeal." Thomas v. Oklahoma, 888 P.2d 522, 525 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 840 (1995); Hale v. State, 807 P.2d 264, 266-
67 (Oka. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902 (1991).

In this case, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals repeatedly applied the doctrine of res judicata in barring Mr. Broades' claim the state district court improperly enhanced his sentence with his two prior convictions.2 Thus, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals disposed of Mr. Broades' claim on adequate and independent state grounds, and federal review is barred unless he can demonstrate cause for his default and actual prejudice as a result, or fundamental miscarriage of justice. In this vein, Mr. Broades alleges "cause" for his procedural default because "new information" showed the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not take "proper notice" of the number of his prior convictions either on direct appeal or in its order affirming denial of state post-
conviction relief. We conclude Mr. Broades fails to show the requisite cause for his state procedural default. Specifically, Mr. Broades fails to show that on appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not consider the actual number of convictions used to enhance his sentence. To the contrary, the record shows the Oklahoma court repeatedly considered and rejected Mr. Broades' argument the district court improperly applied two prior convictions in calculating his sentence. As to its order affirming the denial of the first state post-convictioni relief, the court refused to consider the issue on res judicata grounds. In any event, the district court tolled the period in which Mr. Broades' first request for state post-conviction relief was pending. As to the second post- conviction petition, the state courts again refused to consider the prior conviction issue on res judicata grounds. In addition, the state district court pointed out Mr. Borades' second post-conviction petition constituted Mr. Broades' fifth legal challenge to his sentence and was frivolous. Under these circumstances, we conclude the district court did not err in failing to toll the limitation period during the pendency of either his "Motion for [Order] Nunc Pro Tunc" or his second state post-conviction petition on res judicata grounds.

Finally, Mr. Broades' conclusory statement that this court's failure to further toll his limitation period "would be a grave miscarriage of justice" is insufficient to meet the miscarriage of justice exception. The "fundamental miscarriage of justice" burden is satisfied only if Mr. Broades produces facts amounting to a "colorable showing of factual innocence." Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986). While the state enhanced Mr. Broades' sentence on the basis of two underlying convictions, he has not attempted to show he is factually innocent of those prior convictions.

In order for this court to grant a certificate of appealability, Mr. Broades must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). He fails to make the requisite showing. Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, and substantially the same reasons set forth in the district court's May 4, 2000 Order, we deny Mr. Broades' request for a certificate of appealability, deny his October 11, 2000 "Motion for Leave to File Judicial Notice," and DISMISS his appeal.

Entered by the Court:

WADE BRORBY

United States Circuit Judge