FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

DEC 19 2000

PATRICK FISHER
Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

JOHN HENRY JAMES,

	Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

GENE ATHERTON, Warden; JOHN W. SUTHERS, Dir. DOC;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO ,

	Respondents-Appellees.	No. 00-1267
(D.C. No. 99-Z-2464)
(Colorado)	

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, EBEL, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

	John Henry James was convicted in 1994 of murdering a fellow inmate and sentenced to life in prison.  He filed this pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 raising numerous challenges to his conviction.  The district court dismissed the action on two grounds, holding that Mr. James had failed to exhaust his state remedies and that his application was barred under the one-year limitation period imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).  We conclude that his action is time-barred.  We therefore deny his application for a certificate of appealability and his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss his appeal.
	The one-year limitation period at issue here was added by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which took effect on April 24, 1996.  Mr. James filed his section 2254 petition in December, 1999, and it is therefore subject to the AEDPA provisions.  Under AEDPA, a person in custody pursuant to a state court judgment must file an application for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 within one year from the date that “the judgment becomes final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).  
	Mr. James was convicted on August 24, 1994, and the state supreme court denied certiorari review of his direct appeal on May 19, 1997.  He then had ninety days in which to seek certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court.  See Sup. Ct. R. 13.1.  Thus for purposes of section 2244(d)(1)(A) his conviction became final and his one-year period began to run on August 17, 1997.  He did not file his section 2254 petition, however, until December 15, 1999, well after the one-year period had ended.  We agree with the district court that actions Mr. James filed after the limitation period had expired do not toll the period.  Accordingly, his appeal is DISMISSED.
						ENTERED FOR THE COURT
						Stephanie K. Seymour
						Chief Judge