UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

CARL C. BOWLES,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and R. E. HOLT, Warden,

Respondents-Appellees.	Nos. 00-1278

00-1322

(D.C. No. 00-Z-277)

(Colorado)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, EBEL, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

Carl Bowles, a federal prisoner incarcerated since 1965, brought a pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his continued imprisonment on several grounds. After Mr. Bowles filed an amended petition, a federal magistrate judge ruled that it failed to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and directed Mr. Bowles to file a second amended petition setting out a short, plain statement of each claim showing that he is entitled to relief. Mr. Bowles then filed a second amended petition, which the district court dismissed sua sponte without seeking a response from defendants. The complaint was dismissed without prejudice. The court ruled that one claim appeared to attack the validity of his federal conviction and sentence in California and must therefore be brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the district where sentence was imposed. The court dismissed the remaining three claims for failure to comply with Rule 8, pointing out that they were not supported by specific factual allegations, but were instead either vague and conclusory allegations or references to other documents whose relevance was not explained. Mr. Bowles appeals, and we affirm in part and reverse in part.

As the district judge recognized,

[a] pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and

held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers. We believe that this rule means that if the court can

reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the

plaintiff could prevail, it should do so despite the plaintiff's failure

to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories,

his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with

pleading requirements. At the same time, we do not believe it is the

proper function of the district court to assume the role of advocate

for the pro se litigant.

Hall v. Belmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). In the fourth claim of Mr. Bowles' second amended petition, he alleges that respondents have illegally restrained him past his mandatory parole date by classifying him as having a mental problem such that he would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to others, have illegally ordered a mental health examination for him without due process, and have failed to comply with the due process requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 4247. See rec., vol. I, doc. 15 at 8. In other material before the district court, Mr. Bowles alleges that 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246-47 and federal regulations establish procedures applicable in these circumstances which respondents did not follow. See id. doc. 16 (memorandum in support of motion for mental health examination) & exs. 1 & 3.

Although we of course express no opinion on the merits of these allegations, liberally construed they allege the denial of liberty without due process and therefore satisfy Rule 8 when viewed under the liberal pleading standards applied to pro se litigants. Accordingly we reverse the dismissal of this claim and remand for further proceedings.1 We agree with the district court's disposition of Mr. Bowles' other three claims and therefore affirm their dismissal without prejudice.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Stephanie K. Seymour

Chief Judge