FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

JAN 3 2001

PATRICK FISHER
Clerk

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

AMIGOS BRAVOS, a nonprofit corporation and NEW MEXICO CITIZENS FOR CLEAN AIR AND WATER, a nonprofit corporation,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; CAROL BROWNER, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; GREG COOK, EPA Regional Administrator for Region VI,

Defendants - Appellees.	No. 99-2346	

	Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. No. CIV-99-327-DJS)

Submitted on the briefs:*

Matthew Bishop, Western Environmental Law Center, Taos, New Mexico for the Plaintiffs-Appellants.

John W. Zavitz, Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Renea Ryland, United States Environmental Protection Agency Office of Regional Counsel, Dallas, Texas, Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Evelyn Ying, Melaine Williams, Kathryn E. Kovacs, United States Department of Justice Environmental & Natural Resources Division, Appellate Section, Washington, D.C. for the Defendants-Appellees.

Before BRORBY, KELLY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

LUCERO, Circuit Judge.

	Plaintiffs-appellants Amigos Bravos and New Mexico Citizens for Clean Air and Water bring this civil action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), the EPA Administrator, and the EPA Regional Administrator under a citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act (“the Act”), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2).  Appellants allege that in February 1998 the EPA recognized an illegal point source discharge of pollutants entering the Red River from waste rock piles of Molycorp, Inc.’s molybdenum mine site near Questa, New Mexico but has failed to take any corrective or enforcement action.  The district court concluded that the suit is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel and dismissed the matter with prejudice.  Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
I

	The district court’s collateral estoppel determination is based on the outcome of a case filed by appellants in 1995 against Molycorp.  In that case, brought under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1), appellants alleged that the discharge of pollutants leached from the waste rock piles into the Red River was not authorized by the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit reissued by the EPA in September 1993.  See Amigos Bravos v. Molycorp, Inc., No. 97-2327, 1998 WL 792159 (10th Cir. Nov. 13, 1998) (unpublished disposition).  The district court granted Molycorp’s summary judgment motion on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over appellants’ claims.
	In making its determination, the district court examined the EPA’s permitting process and the issues resolved in connection with the Molycorp permit.  It “determined that, ‘[w]ithout question, the EPA made a decision that Molycorp did not need a permit for any ground water seepage into the Red River, regardless of whether Molycorp’s operations polluted the ground water and, eventually, the river.’”  Id. at **3 (quoting the district court’s order).  Because, “‘[a]t its core, [appellants’] complaint attack[ed] the EPA’s decision to reissue Molycorp’s NPDES permit,’” appellants were required to bring their claims to the court of appeals in a petition for review under 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F).  Id.  Accordingly, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  On appeal, this Court affirmed.  See id. at **4.
	In the present case, appellants assert that their claims are premised entirely on the EPA’s recognition of the allegedly illegal point source discharge in a February 13, 1998 report entitled “Report on Hydrological Connection Associated with Molycorp Mining Activity, Questa, New Mexico.”  They contend that the EPA’s report constituted a change of position that triggered a duty under § 309(a)(3) of the Act, requiring the EPA to take some form of corrective action against Molycorp.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3).  Additionally, appellants assert that the EPA’s failure to take action amounts to an illegal exemption of a known point source discharge from the Act’s permit provisions.  See id. § 1342(a)(1) (requiring, for “the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants,” a NPDES permit prescribing conditions “necessary to carry out” the Act’s provisions); id. § 1311(a) (making illegal any pollutant discharges not specifically allowed by an NPDES permit).  
II

	We review de novo a district court’s determination that collateral estoppel bars a plaintiff’s claims.  See Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 203 F.3d 1190, 1197 (10th Cir. 2000).  Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, “once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case.”  Ag Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Nielsen, 231 F.3d 726, 732 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotations and citations omitted).  As applied in the Tenth Circuit, the elements of collateral estoppel are:
(1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the action in question, (2) the prior action has been finally adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.

Dodge, 203 F.3d at 1198.

	In this case, neither the first nor the fourth element is satisfied.  The issue in contention in the prior action concerned appellants’ allegations of a point source discharge that should have been taken into consideration in the EPA’s decision to reissue Molycorp’s 1993 NPDES permit.  Here, the issue is whether the EPA has a duty to take action once it discovers an illegal point source discharge.  Although factually related, these two issues are not identical.  Furthermore, as a matter of timing, appellants did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the current issue in the prior action.  The EPA report was issued over two years after initiation of the earlier action, during the pendency of appellants’ appeal.  Resolving the duty issue was not necessary, or even relevant, to the judgment in the earlier action.  Accordingly, the district court was incorrect in concluding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel operates to bar the instant action.
	We acknowledge the EPA’s argument that, even if collateral estoppel does not bar litigation of this case, we may affirm the district court’s dismissal on an alternative basis.  We decline to do so.  “As a general rule, we do not consider issues not passed on below, and it is appropriate to remand the case to the district court to address an issue first.”  N. Texas Prod. Credit Ass’n  v. McCurtain County Nat’l Bank, 222 F.3d 800, 812 (10th Cir. 2000).Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1129 (10th Cir. 1999) (further citations and quotations omitted).    The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.