FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

NOV 21 2001

PATRICK FISHER
Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

MELVYN PAUL RIVERS,

	Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DANIEL B. KING; LINDA SWANSON; LANGSTAFF; IRVING ETTENBERG; D.A. VERNON; CHRISTOPHER CROSS; PHILLIP M. CLARK; PAT SULLIVAN; BARBARA DENMARK; LEE GRAAF; and ROBERT RUSSELL,

	Defendants-Appellees.	No. 01-1294
(D.C. No. 01-Z-611)
(Colorado)	

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before TACHA, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge.

	After examining plaintiff’s opening brief and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal.  See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).  The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
	Plaintiff Melvyn Paul Rivers, proceeding pro se, is appealing the district court’s order and judgment dismissing his civil rights complaint.  Our jurisdiction arises under 12 U.S.C. § 1291.  We affirm.
	Plaintiff was convicted of first degree assault under Colorado law.  He received, and is currently serving, a mandatory enhanced sentence for committing a crime of violence.  Plaintiff has filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against his public defender, two of the district attorneys involved in the state court prosecution, four state court judges, a detective, two state probation office employees, and a county sheriff.  In his complaint, plaintiff claimed that he was falsely arrested, that he was subjected to double jeopardy and excessive bail, and that his due process, equal protection, and Eighth Amendment rights were violated because:  (1) he was originally arrested and detained on a charge of second degree assault; however, while he was being detained on that charge, the district attorney obtained an “at large” arrest warrant on the charge of first degree assault based on perjured testimony; (2) he was never arrested or given bond on the charge of first degree assault; (3) he was detained on the charge of second degree assault without a court order; (4) he was deprived of his right to habeas relief on the charge of second degree assault; and (5) he received an enhanced sentence based on false information in the presentence report.  Plaintiff requested both money damages and that he be immediately released from prison and his entire criminal record expunged.  Plaintiff also requested that defendants be prosecuted under local law.
	The district court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint.  First, the court found that a judgment in plaintiff’s favor under § 1983 would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.  Accordingly, the court found that plaintiff’s claims are subject to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and that, under Heck, he “may not seek an award of damages unless he has invalidated his conviction prior to bringing this action.”  R., Doc. 11, at 3.  Because plaintiff failed to show that his conviction was invalidated prior to the filing of his § 1983 claims, the district court dismissed the claims against the detective, the sheriff, and the probation office employees without prejudice.  
	Second, the court dismissed plaintiff’s claims against the remaining defendants with prejudice, finding that the public defender was not acting under color of state law, see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981), that the district attorneys are entitled to absolute immunity because they were acting within the scope of their duties as prosecutors, see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976), and that the state court judges are entitled to absolute immunity because they were acting in their judicial capacity, see Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1994).
	Because he is proceeding pro se, we must construe plaintiff’s complaint liberally.  Id. at 1265.  Further, “[t]he sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law which we review de novo.”  Id.  (quotation omitted).  “Accordingly, we apply the same scrutiny to the complaint as did the trial court.”  Id.  (quotation omitted).  In this regard, we assume the district court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.  We therefore accept the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to plaintiff.  See Yoder v. Honeywell Inc., 104 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 1997).
	Applying these standards, we agree with the district court’s analysis.  We affirm the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint for the reasons set forth in the district 

court’s order and judgment dated June 12, 2001.  
	Finally, plaintiff’s motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of the filing fee is granted.  We remind plaintiff that because his motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal was granted, he must continue making partial payments on court fees and costs previously assessed until such have been paid in full. 
	The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED.	
			Entered for the Court

			Stephanie K. Seymour 
			Circuit Judge