FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

MAR 4 2003

PATRICK FISHER
Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

ROWANA K. RIGGS,

	Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

AMERICAN HERITAGE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

	Defendant - Appellee.	

No. 02-3198
(D.C. No. 00-CV-2433-CM)
(D. Kansas)	

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before EBEL, LUCERO, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

	After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal.  See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).  The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

	Rowana K. Riggs, acting pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of her civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2003), we affirm.

	On September 27, 2000, Ms. Riggs filed a pro se complaint against American Heritage Life Insurance Company (“American”) claiming she became totally disabled due to bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and seeking damages for alleged violations of her civil rights stemming from American’s refusal to pay total disability under two credit disability insurance policies.  The district court liberally construed her complaint to state claims for denial of disability benefits in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and Titles I, II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12111, et seq.

	We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999).  “[A]ll well-pleaded factual allegations in the . . . complaint are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  A 12(b)(6) motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”  Id.  (internal quotations and citations omitted).  Although we liberally construe a pro se complaint, “we will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a  plaintiff’s behalf.”  Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 1997). 
	We turn now to Ms. Riggs’s complaint.  Title VII  of the Civil Rights Act protects against employment discrimination.  Ms. Riggs does not claim  an employment relationship with American.  Therefore, her Title VII claim fails.  Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination by a “covered entity.”  42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).  Since Ms. Riggs did not and apparently could not demonstrate American is a “covered entity,” this claim fails.  Further, her claim under Title II of the ADA fails because Title II protects disabled persons from discrimination by a “public entity.”  42 U.S.C. § 12132.  Ms. Riggs cannot demonstrate American is a “public entity.”  Finally, Ms. Riggs’s claim under Title III of the ADA fails because she seeks only damages, and Title III limits the remedy of a private claim to injunctive relief.  42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1).
	We conclude Ms. Riggs was unable to establish any facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief.  Therefore, the district court was correct to dismiss her complaint for failure to state a claim and its judgment is AFFIRMED.

						Entered by the Court:

						TERRENCE L. O’BRIEN
						United States Circuit Judge