Richard D. Wagner (I. Michele Drummond with him on the brief) of Wagner,
Stuart & Cannon, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee.
Canadian Valley Electric Cooperative provides electricity to customers in
Oklahoma through overhead electric distribution lines. These lines require daily
maintenance and repair. For the most part, Canadian Valley uses its own
employees and equipment to perform the maintenance and repair work.
On one particular occasion, Canadian Valley hired Gordon Construction
Company as an independent contractor to assist in repairing distribution lines
following a severe ice storm. Due to the magnitude of the storm damage,
Canadian Valley could not complete the work in the time required by Oklahoma
law using only its own employees.(1)
Tragically, an employee of Gordon
Construction, Dustin Price, sustained injuries and died while working on a
distribution line.
The personal representative of Mr. Price's estate, Ms. Coshatt, brought suit
against Canadian Valley in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma. She apparently claimed Canadian Valley negligently
electrocuted Mr. Price when it energized the distribution line upon which he was
working. Canadian Valley moved to dismiss the complaint under Rules 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, challenging the facts upon
which the district court's subject matter jurisdiction depended. The district court
granted the motion and held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action
due to the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act of
Oklahoma. Ms. Coshatt appeals.
We review de novo whether the district court properly dismissed a
complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Holt v.
United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995). We review for clear error
the district court's findings of jurisdictional facts. See id.
The Workers' Compensation Act of Oklahoma is the exclusive remedy for
accidental injuries sustained during the course and scope of a worker's
employment. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85, §§ 11, 12. See also
Harter Concrete
Prod., Inc. v. Harris, 592 P.2d 526, 528 (Okla. 1979); Carroll v. District Court
of the Fifteenth Judicial Dist., 579 P.2d 828, 830 (Okla. 1978). Claims arising
under the Act must be brought in the Workers' Compensation Court of
Oklahoma. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit 85, §§ 26(B), 122. See
also State Ins. Fund
v. Asarco, Inc., 782 P.2d 113, 114 (Okla. 1989); Carroll, 579 P.2d
at 830. A
principal hirer for whom an independent contractor is working is immune under
the Act from tort liability for injuries sustained by the contractor's employees
during the course of employment. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85, §§ 11,
12. See
also Izard v. United States, 946 F.2d 1492, 1494 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Murphy
v. Chickasha Mobile Homes, Inc., 611 P.2d 243, 244-45 (Okla. 1980)). In order
to qualify as a principal hirer, the contract work performed by the independent
contractor must be "necessary and integral" to the hirer's operations. See
Bradley v. Clark, 804 P.2d 425, 427 (Okla. 1990); Izard, 946 F.2d at
1494 (citing
Murphy, 611 P.2d at 244-45).
Work performed by an independent contractor is "necessary and integral"
to a hirer's operations when it "(1) [is] directly associated with the day-to-day
activity carried on by the hirer's line of trade, industry or business or (2) would
customarily be done in that line of business." Murphy, 611 P.2d at 248. "[A]s a
sharp tool for implementing" this two-part standard, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Bradley v. Clark adopted a "more restrictive" three-tier analysis from
Louisiana case law. 804 P.2d at 427-28 (adopting the three-tier analysis set forth
in Berry v. Holston Well Serv., Inc., 488 So.2d 934, 937-38 (La. 1986)). Under
the three-tier Bradley analysis, a court should inquire (1) whether the contract
work is specialized or non-specialized; (2) if non-specialized, whether the
contract work is a part of the hirer's trade, business, or occupation; and (3)
whether the hirer was engaged in the same contract work as the contractor at the
time of the injury. See Bradley, 804 P.2d at 428 n.10.
In a well-reasoned decision applying the three-tier Bradley analysis, the
district court held Gordon Construction and Mr. Price were performing work
necessary and integral to Canadian Valley's operations at the time of Mr. Price's
injuries and death. In considering the first tier of the analysis, the district court
concluded the contract work repairing damaged electrical lines was
non-specialized because Canadian Valley "was not without the skill, knowledge,
training or equipment to perform the task in question" and actually performed the
work "on a daily basis." Under the second tier of the analysis, the district court
concluded the contract work was part of Canadian Valley's trade, business, or
occupation because the work was regular and customary; Canadian Valley
possessed the equipment necessary to perform the work; its employees had the
skill and training necessary to perform the work; and its employees performed the
work on a daily basis. Finally, the district court concluded the third tier of the
Bradley analysis was satisfied. Canadian Valley employees were repairing
damaged distribution lines at the time of Mr. Price's injuries and death. We see
no error in the district court's conclusions. Under the circumstances of this case,
we agree with the district court the contract work was necessary and integral to
Canadian Valley's operations.
Ms. Coshatt argues the district court "improperly focused on the individual
task being performed by Dustin Price." She believes the contract work "is
properly characterized as nonrecurring, time-sensitive emergency repairs, not
day-to-day line repair." The Bradley court noted "[n]onrecurring or
extraordinary" repairs are usually not necessary and integral to a hirer's
operations. Bradley, 804 P.2d at 428 n.10. In essence, Ms. Coshatt argues the
contract work was nonrecurring and extraordinary because the ice storm was the
"worst ... in 100 years" and caused damage "the magnitude of which likely will
not be seen again." She acknowledged at oral argument, however, there is no
case law to support this argument.(2)
In any event, we disagree with her argument
for two reasons. First, we do not believe the severity of the ice storm or the
amount of damage to the distribution lines significant under the facts of this case.
The ice storm did not change the type of work Canadian Valley customarily
performed and hired Gordon Construction and Mr. Price to perform. Second, Ms.
Coshatt's factual assertions are not supported by the record. The record indicates
only the ice storm was "severe" and the amount of damage required Canadian
Valley to hire Gordon Construction to help make timely repairs. There is no
evidence the severity of the ice storm or the amount of damage it caused was
nonrecurring or extraordinary. In fact, Ms. Coshatt conceded at oral argument
ice storms damage electric distribution lines every year in Oklahoma.
In a related argument, Ms. Coshatt claims the contract work cannot be
necessary and integral to Canadian Valley's operations because it did not have
enough manpower to complete the work in the time required by law. A court
should consider as a factor in the second tier of the Bradley analysis whether the
hirer has "the equipment and/or manpower capable of performing the contract
work." Bradley, 804 P.2d at 428 n.10. This factor "focuses on determining
whether the contract work, as it relates to the hirer, is ordinarily handled through
employees." Id. Canadian Valley admits it did not have sufficient employees to
complete the work in a timely manner but argues it ordinarily performs the
contract work. It also argues its employees were capable of performing the
contract work and were performing the same work as Gordon Construction and
Mr. Price. We conclude Canadian Valley had manpower capable of performing
the contract work. All the evidence indicates Canadian Valley normally used its
own employees to maintain and repair electric distribution lines. Although
Canadian Valley occasionally hired independent contractors like Gordon
Construction to help make timely repairs, we cannot find any Oklahoma law
indicating the use of independent contractors in such a manner renders otherwise
necessary contract work unnecessary to the hirer's operations.(3)
In sum, we conclude the district court correctly dismissed Ms. Coshatt's
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Gordon Construction and Mr.
Price were performing work necessary and integral to Canadian Valley's
operations at the time of Mr. Price's injuries and death. Canadian Valley was
therefore a principal hirer and is liable to Mr. Price, if at all, only under the
Workers' Compensation Act of Oklahoma in Workers' Compensation Court. The
district court's order is AFFIRMED.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
*. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors
the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1. Although Oklahoma law does not
mandate a specific time limit within which an
electric utility must restore service, it does require an electric utility to "make such efforts
as are reasonable under the circumstances to minimize the adverse effects of
disconnection of service" "[f]or the purpose of essential repair, maintenance or testing of
utility equipment." Okla. Admin. Code § 165:35-21-30(2). Oklahoma law also
requires
electric utilities to have a "written restoration of service policy/plan" with the objective of
restoring service "as soon as possible." Id. § 165:35-19-4(2).
2. Ms. Coshatt does cite in her appellate
brief various Louisiana appeals court cases
in support of her argument, but all the cases are distinguishable on their facts. In each of
the cited cases, the hirers rarely, if ever, performed the contract work in question.
See
Richard v. Teague, 636 So.2d 1160, 1171 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Graves v. Lou
Ana Foods,
Inc., 604 So.2d 150, 158 (La. Ct. App. 1992); Fountain v. Central Louisiana Elec.
Co.,
Inc., 578 So.2d 236, 239 (La. Ct. App. 1991). For example, a Louisiana appeals court
concluded in Fountain the major conversion of a particular electric line was
"nonrecurring" when it was done only about once every twenty years and the hirer had a
policy of contracting out line conversions of such magnitude 13.2 kilovolts to 34.5
kilovolts. Fountain, 578 So.2d at 236, 239. In contrast, Canadian Valley performed
the
contract work on a daily basis. The ice storm changed only the amount of work, not the
type of work, Canadian Valley employees normally performed. The contract work itself
was therefore not extraordinary or nonrecurring.
3. Ms. Coshatt again cites certain Louisiana
appeals court cases in support of her
argument, but, as discussed above, we believe the critical factor in each was the
hirer's
employees rarely, if ever, did the type of work in question. See Richard,
636 So.2d at
1171; DeWoody v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 604 So.2d 92, 98 (La. Ct.
App. 1992);
Fountain, 578 So.2d at 239. This is consistent with the focus of the
second tier of the
Bradley analysis, which is to determine whether the contract work is ordinarily
handled
through the hirer's employees. See Bradley, 804 P.2d at 428 n.10;
DeWoody, 604 So.2d
at 98. Unlike the facts in the cases cited by Ms. Coshatt, Canadian Valley's employees
performed the contract work on a daily basis. Canadian Valley only hired Gordon
Construction to assist its own employees in order to complete the contract work in a
timely manner.
SHEILA RENAE COSHATT, as
personal representative of the Estate
of Duston Price, deceased,
Joseph T. Acquaviva, Jr. (Tim D. Cain and Jeff C. Grotta on the briefs) of
Wilson, Cain & Acquaviva, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Before KELLY, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior
Circuit Judge, and MURPHY,
Circuit Judge.
In this diversity case, Ms. Renae Coshatt appeals a district court order
dismissing her complaint against Canadian Valley Electric Cooperative for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court determined Ms. Coshatt's
exclusive remedy was under the Workers' Compensation Act of Oklahoma. See
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85, §§ 11, 12. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291, we conclude the district court did not err in dismissing Ms. Coshatt's
complaint.
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