FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

APR 2 2004

PATRICK FISHER
Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

QUAY V. ZEVELY, JR.,

		Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner, Social Security Administration,

		Defendant-Appellee.	

No.  03-7058
(D.C. No. 02-CV-72-P)
(E.D. Okla.)	

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before BRISCOE and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge.

	After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument.  See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).  The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
	Plaintiff-appellant Quay V. Zevely, Jr. appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of his application for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act.  We exercise jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
	Plaintiff claims that he has been unable to work since 1991 due to limitations caused by post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, arthritis, hypertension, gout, and headaches.  After his application for disability benefits was denied initially and on reconsideration, a de novo hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ).  In a decision dated December 8, 1999, the ALJ denied plaintiff’s application for disability benefits, concluding: (1) that plaintiff’s insured status expired on September 30, 1997; and (2) that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that he was under a disability on or before that date.  In December 2001, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision.  Plaintiff then filed a complaint in the district court.  After the magistrate judge recommended that the ALJ’s decision denying benefits be affirmed, the district court entered an order affirming the denial of benefits.  This appeal followed.
	On February 12, 2004, we entered an order directing the Commissioner to submit certified copies of the medical evidence from the Oklahoma City Veterans Administration Medical Center covering the period December 7, 1999 through July 21, 2000 to this court within thirty days.  We directed the Commissioner to submit these records because, although they were considered by the Appeals Council, they were not contained in the administrative record that the Commissioner submitted to the district court.  As a result, we were unable to conduct the required de novo review and determine whether the Appeals Council erred in concluding that the records were “not material to the issue of whether [plaintiff was] disabled at a time when [he] met the insured status requirements.”  Aplt. App., Vol. II at 4; see also Threet v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 1185, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that question of whether evidence submitted to Appeals Council qualifies as “new, material, and chronologically pertinent is a question of law subject to [this court’s] de novo review,” and that “[e]vidence is material to the determination of disability if there is a reasonable possibility that [it] would have changed the outcome”) (quotation omitted).
	The Commissioner submitted the requested records to this court on March 10, 2004, and they consist primarily of progress notes relating to therapy sessions that plaintiff attended for treatment of his PTSD from December 1999 through July 2000.  Because the records do not contain any background information or any sort of medical history regarding plaintiff’s PTSD, we agree with the Appeals Council that the records are not material to the issue of whether plaintiff was disabled during the time when he met the insured status requirements.  Consequently, the records do not provide any basis for this court to reverse the decision of the ALJ denying benefits.
	In addition to claiming reversible error based upon the records that were omitted from the administrative record, a claim that is now moot, plaintiff has asserted three other alleged errors: (1) that the ALJ breached his duty to develop the administrative record because he failed to obtain and consider evidence associated with the disability rating that plaintiff has received from the Veterans Administration; (2) that the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff did not suffer from a severe mental impairment prior to the expiration of his insured status is not supported by substantial evidence in the record; and (3) that the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform medium work despite his documented knee impairment is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.
	Based on the record currently before this court, it appears that plaintiff has failed to establish reversible error based on his second and third claims.  We decline to address the merits of those claims, however, because we agree with plaintiff that the ALJ breached his duty to develop the administrative record by failing to obtain and consider evidence associated with any disability ratings that plaintiff has received from the Veterans Administration.  See Baca v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 5 F.3d 476, 480 (10th Cir. 1993) (addressing Veterans Administration disability rating and holding that “[a]lthough findings by [the Veterans Administration] are not binding on the [Commissioner], they are entitled to weight and must be considered,” and remanding with directions “to obtain the records from the VA”) (quotation omitted).  As a result, we reverse the ALJ’s denial of benefits and remand this case to the Commissioner.  On remand, the Commissioner shall obtain and address the findings of the Veterans Administration with respect to any disability ratings received by plaintiff and determine the effect, if any, that the findings have on plaintiff’s application for social security disability benefits.  We stress, however, that we are expressing no opinion concerning whether any disability ratings from the Veterans Administration should change the result in this case.  Id.
	The order of the district court is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED to the district court with instructions to remand the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment.

				Entered for the Court

				Wade Brorby
				Senior Circuit Judge