FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

FEB 10 2005

PATRICK FISHER
Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

MILTON T. COLBERT, II,

	Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PRISON HEALTH SERVICES; (FNU) SHELTON, Warden, Norton Correctional Facility; (FNU) TIEN, RN, Norton Correctional Facility; (FNU) JOHNSTON, RN, Administrator, Norton Correctional Facility,

	Defendants-Appellees.	No. 04-3259
(D.C. No. 03-CV-3247-GTV)
(Kansas)	

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before SEYMOUR, LUCERO, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

	Milton T. Colbert, II, a prison inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the district court’s dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c)(2)(B) of his civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to state a claim.  We affirm.  
	In his complaint, Mr. Colbert alleged prison officials and medical staff at the Norton Correctional Facility in Norton, Kansas, subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by denying him medical attention.  He claimed that on May 21, 2003, he went to the prison medical facility complaining of back, leg, and head pains that he believed were the result of an earlier, serious car accident.   He informed the nurse he would like to see a doctor as soon as possible, but was told no appointment was available until at least May 29.  He visited the facility again on May 25 to seek an earlier appointment but was told his situation was not an emergency.  He was scheduled to see a doctor on June 3.  He filed this suit after exhausting administrative remedies.  
	The district court ruled that the prison officials and medical staff were not deliberatively indifferent to Mr. Colbert’s serious medical needs and therefore did not violate his Eighth Amendment rights.  The court further ruled that any delay in providing medical care did not violate the Eighth Amendment because Mr. Colbert did not demonstrate he had been substantially harmed.  On the contrary, the court held the record submitted by Mr. Colbert demonstrated he received adequate and timely attention.

	We review Mr. Colbert’s submissions liberally as directed by Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).  We review a district court’s dismissal of a case for failure to state a claim de novo.  Perkins v. Kansas Dep’t of Corrs., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999).  	Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend.  In determining whether dismissal is proper, we must accept the allegations of the complaint as true and we must construe those allegations, and any reasonable inferences that might be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Id. (citations omitted).  In reviewing the pleadings, we also consider any attached exhibits.  See Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1275 (10th Cir. 2001).  In this case, Mr. Colbert submitted a complaint and a supplemental pleading arguing that he had exhausted administrative remedies, to which medical and grievance documents were attached.  
	To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment regarding inadequate or delayed medical attention, a prisoner must demonstrate that officials were deliberately indifferent to his or her serious medical needs.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976); Oxendine, 241 F.3d at 1276.  This standard includes both objective and subjective components: the deprivation must be “sufficiently serious” and the government official must have “acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”  Oxendine, 241 F.3d at 1276.  A deprivation is “sufficiently serious” if it “has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or . . . is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s assessment.”  Id. (quotation omitted).  A prisoner must further establish that any delay in medical attention resulted in “substantial harm.”  Id. (quotation omitted).  Generally speaking, “a prisoner who merely disagrees with a diagnosis or a prescribed course of treatment does not state a constitutional violation.”  Perkins, 165 F.3d at 811.
	On appeal, Mr. Colbert contends he established that the prison officials and medical staff were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs “by showing that they did not let me see a doctor on the date I was supposed to and moved it to a later date because of a mistake that was made by them.”  Aplt. Br. at 2.  In support of his arguments, he cites Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 1992) (for purposes of qualified immunity analysis, prison officials’ forcing plaintiff to fly after ear surgery against the orders of his treating physician could have constituted deliberate indifference), abrogation recognized on other grounds by Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2002); and Mullen v. Smith, 738 F.2d 317, 318-19 (8th Cir. 1984) (dismissal reversed in part where prison officials abused plaintiff and denied plaintiff pain treatment for six weeks after plaintiff fell).  He also claims the district court did not consider that the prison officials and medical staff failed to “look into” the fact “that [he] had a bad accident.”  Aplt. Br. at 4. 
	We agree with the district court that Mr. Colbert received treatment and did not sufficiently allege the treatment was inadequate.  His dissatisfaction is  essentially with the medical treatment he did receive.  Although we sympathize with Mr. Colbert’s assertions of chronic pain due to his prior injuries and his frustration over the prison’s apparent mistake regarding the scheduling of his doctor’s appointment, the complaint and supplemental attachments show that Mr. Colbert visited with a nurse practitioner at the time he first requested treatment and received pain medication, nursing staff assessed his situation as not an emergency, the prison ordered Mr. Colbert’s medical records related to the prior car accident, and the doctor he ultimately saw reviewed those records the same day and directed no change in treatment.  While Mr. Colbert says his pains worsened during the time he was waiting to meet with the doctor, he does not allege any facts that undermine the nurses’ course of treatment.  			More importantly, even assuming Mr. Colbert has shown a delay in adequate treatment, he has not pointed to facts establishing he suffered “substantial harm.”  Mr. Colbert’s alleged harms are not comparable to those in the cases upon which he relies, see Hamilton, 981 F.2d at 1067; Mullen, 738 F.2d at 318, nor do they include examples of delayed treatment for life-threatening circumstances, exacerbation of his medical problems, or harm resulting in permanent handicap or loss.  See Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187-88 & n.21 (11th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases)). 
	Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Colbert’s suit for failure to state a claim. 
						ENTERED FOR THE COURT

						Stephanie K. Seymour
						Circuit Judge