FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

February 8, 2006

Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

GEORGE EVANS,

		Plaintiff‑Appellant,

   v.                    

INTEL CORPORATION,

		Defendant‑Appellee.	

No.  04-2302
(D.C. No. CIV-03-809-RHS/WDS)
(D. N.M.)	

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before HENRY, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

	After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument.  See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).  The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.		
	Plaintiff George Evans appeals the district court’s grant of defendant Intel Corporation’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50.  Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
	Mr. Evans was employed by Intel from 1994 until 2003.  He alleges that in fall 2002 he became concerned about Intel’s emissions and voiced his concerns.  Mr. Evans resigned from Intel in May 2003 and thereafter filed a complaint for wrongful termination in New Mexico state court.  In it he asserted that Intel constructively discharged him and that Intel’s constructive discharge constituted (1) a breach of its implied employment contract and (2) a retaliatory discharge.  Intel removed the case to federal court based upon diversity of citizenship.  In 2004, a jury was empaneled and the case went to trial.  At the close of Mr. Evans’s case-in-chief, the district court granted Intel’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, observing that Mr. Evans failed to provide a legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find that he was constructively discharged. 
	Mr. Evans appeals.  He asserts that the district court erred by refusing to admit certain testimony and documents, and by granting Intel’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.  These issues, Mr. Evans acknowledges, are interrelated; that is, “if there was a failure in the plaintiff’s case-in-chief to make a prima facie case,” but “none of the suppressed testimony or exhibits would have cured [that] failure . . . , their exclusion, even if error, would not make a difference to the outcome.”  Aplt. Br. at 27. 				
	We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, applying the same standard as the district court and construing the evidence and all inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmovant.  Shaw v. AAA Eng’g & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519, 529 (10th Cir. 2000).  In diversity cases, such as this, federal law governs the appropriateness of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, while the substantive law of the forum state governs the analysis of underlying claims.  Wolfgang v. Mid‑Am. Motorsports, Inc., 111 F.3d 1515, 1522 (10th Cir. 1997).
	Having reviewed the briefs, the record, and the law in light of the applicable standard of review, we hold that Mr. Evans failed to provide a legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find that Intel constructively discharged him.  To prove constructive discharge an employee must demonstrate “that the employer made working conditions so intolerable, when viewed objectively, that a reasonable person would be compelled to resign.”  Gormley v. Coca‑Cola Enters., 109 P.3d 280, 282‑83 (N.M. 2005).  Mr. Evans’s concerns about Intel’s emissions and several unpleasant events–being placed on a corrective action plan, asked to renegotiate his tax debt, and questioned about his statement that his boss “sucked,” Aplt. App. Vol. II at 320–is not enough to convert a resignation into a constructive discharge.  See Gormley, 109 P.3d at 283 (citing examples of actions that do and do not constitute constructive discharge and observing that “[i]n many cases, the circumstances surrounding resignation are not egregious enough to support a [constructive discharge] claim”).	
	Further, we have reviewed the evidence excluded by the district court and  are satisfied that, even if all of the contested evidence had been admitted, Mr. Evans still would have been unable to prove constructive discharge.  In other words, none of the excluded evidence was material to his constructive discharge claim.  Since Mr. Evans’s substantial rights would have been affected only by the exclusion of evidence material to constructive discharge, we need not determine whether the district court otherwise abused its discretion in excluding the contested evidence.  See K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss Int’l Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 1155-56 (10th Cir. 1985) (stating that the exclusion of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and noting that an “error in the admission or exclusion of evidence is harmless if it does not affect the substantial rights of the parties”).  

	Because, as we hold today, Mr. Evans was unable to demonstrate the threshold issue of constructive discharge, we do not reach his breach-of-contract and retaliatory-discharge claims.  See Gormley v. Coca‑Cola Enters., 85 P.3d 252, 256 (N.M. App. 2003) (“Constructive discharge is a prerequisite to a wrongful termination claim when an employee, such as Plaintiff, resigns.”), aff’d, 109 P.3d 280 (N.M. 2005).  The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.	
	
				Entered for the Court

				Michael R. Murphy
				Circuit Judge