FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

August 8, 2006

Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

		Plaintiff - Appellee,		
	v.	No. 05-1416	
WILLIAM JOHN YEHLING,

		Defendant - Appellant.		

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. NO. 99-CR-61-N)

Wade H. Eldridge, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

Andrew A. Vogt, Assistant United States Attorney (Jerry N. Jones, Assistant United States Attorney, and William J. Leone, United States Attorney, on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before MURPHY, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

I.  Introduction
	Defendant-Appellant William John Yehling was tried and convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine.  He was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment followed by three years’ supervised release.  Shortly after the district court entered judgment, Yehling filed a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  The district court denied the motion approximately four years later.  While the motion was pending, Yehling was free on a personal recognizance bond.  Yehling raises two issues on appeal.  First, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.  Second, he argues the district court’s delay in deciding his motion for a new trial deprived the court of jurisdiction and constituted a denial of Yehling’s right to a speedy trial and due process of law.  This court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to .  We conclude Yehling failed to timely assert his speedy trial and due process rights and did not allege substantial prejudice resulting from the district court’s delay in deciding his motion for a new trial.  His unreasonable delay claims are therefore denied.  We further affirm Yehling’s conviction.  

II.  Background
	Yehling was one of nineteen defendants charged in a twenty-one-count superceding indictment with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of  and  and 846.  The indictment alleged a conspiracy whereby methamphetamine was obtained in California and Colorado for resale to distributors in Ouray County, Colorado.  The indictment alleged Yehling conspired to supply methamphetamine to codefendants Perry Wherley and Eric Avril in Colorado.  
	Yehling and six other defendants were tried jointly.  Defendant Wherley, who had entered into a plea agreement with the government, testified that in 1996, he and defendant Brenda Paul discussed traveling to California to obtain methamphetamine for resale in Colorado.  Thereafter, Wherley and Paul traveled to California every other weekend to purchase three to four ounces of methamphetamine from defendant Jodey Gravett.  Wherley would then cut the methamphetamine into gram quantities and package it for resale to customers in Ouray County.  After Wherley and Paul had a disagreement, Michael Sullings began to accompany Wherley on his trips to California.  Wherley testified he and Sullings made ten to twelve trips from Colorado to California, purchasing between two and four ounces of methamphetamine from Gravett each time.  After Sullings was arrested, defendant Avril accompanied Wherley to California.  For these trips, Avril located a new source, defendant Robert Silcock.  Wherley testified he and Avril traveled to California once a month for several months, purchasing two to three ounces of methamphetamine each time.  In July 1998, Wherley stopped traveling to California and, instead, began obtaining methamphetamine in Colorado. 
	Wherley testified he approached Yehling, whom he had met when they worked together at Blackhawk Construction, in an attempt to locate someone to supply large quantities of methamphetamine in Colorado.  Yehling located a potential source named Jovanni.  The FBI intercepted several subsequent telephone conversations between Wherley, Avril, and Yehling discussing the source.  In September 1998, Yehling called Wherley to inform him Avril had stopped by Yehling’s house to get “a little bit” and was “really happy with the stuff.”  ROA, Supp. Vol. III, Ex. 49.  Yehling indicated the price was down to $700 per ounce.  Wherley asked whether Yehling had more available immediately.  Yehling stated, “I wanted to make sure everybody was satisfied before I did anything different,” but indicated he could obtain more the next day.  ROA, Supp. Vol. III, Ex. 49.  Yehling also stated he was “in with the Mexican cartel” and was interested in “turn[ing] over a bunch and make[ing] some dough.”  ROA, Supp. Vol. III, Ex. 49.  
	Three days later, in another recorded conversation, Yehling told Wherley his source wanted $1000 per ounce.  Yehling indicated he thought the price was too high and would try to find another source.  Several weeks later, Yehling called Wherley to ask if he wanted to “place an order.”  ROA, Supp. Vol. III, Ex. 57.  Wherley requested an eight-ball (three-and-one-half grams of methamphetamine) and then called Avril to inform him of the deal.  Avril asked whether Yehling could supply ounce quantities.  Wherley replied that Yehling could, but his source wanted too much money.  
	At trial, Wherley admitted Yehling had provided samples from his source.  Nevertheless, Yehling argued Wherley indicated a deal was never reached and thus Yehling did not provide Wherley with any methamphetamine for the purpose of redistributing it to others.  Avril, who had also entered into a plea agreement with the government, testified he purchased an eight-ball of methamphetamine from Yehling on one occasion.  Avril indicated that if he “liked it,” he and Wherley would purchase ounce quantities from Yehling’s source.  ROA, Vol. X at 1273.  Avril stated, however, the methamphetamine was intended for his personal use. 
	Yehling was interviewed by FBI Special Agent Emerson Buie after his arrest.  Buie testified that Yehling admitted knowing Wherley was buying and selling methamphetamine.  Yehling also knew Wherley had made several trips to California with Avril and Sullings to obtain methamphetamine.  Yehling told Buie that Wherley approached him at work seeking a local supplier in Colorado. Yehling admitted to locating a potential source named Jovanni, introducing Wherley to Jovanni, and providing Avril with less than a quarter gram of methamphetamine as a sample.  Yehling’s residence was searched, but no drugs, baggies, scales, or large sums of cash were found. 
	At the close of evidence, the jury returned a verdict finding Yehling, and five of his codefendants, guilty of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine.  The district court sentenced Yehling to eighteen months’ imprisonment followed by three years’ supervised release.  On December 4, 2001, Yehling filed a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  At trial, Avril had testified Justin Coykendall told him Yehling gave Coykendall methamphetamine to give to Avril.  Yehling’s motion for a new trial asserted he had located Coykendall, and Coykendall would deny the statement attributed to him by Avril.  Yehling also filed a motion to stay his obligation to surrender for service of his sentence until the district court ruled on his motion for a new trial.  The district court granted the stay.
	The district court did not decide Yehling’s motion for a new trial for almost four years.  In March 2004 and 2005, Yehling filed motions seeking the district court’s permission to travel to Cozumel, Mexico for his honeymoon and Boston to watch his brother run the Boston Marathon, respectively.  Both motions indicated Yehling’s motion for a new trial was still pending before the district court.  The district court granted permission for Yehling to travel on both occasions, but did not rule on Yehling’s motion for a new trial.  
	Recognizing Yehling’s motion had been pending for almost four years, the government requested a status conference in June 2005.  Yehling subsequently filed a motion seeking resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, which had been decided by the Supreme Court while Yehling’s motion for a new trial was pending.  .  Yehling requested he be resentenced to probation for time already served.  On August 26, 2005, the district court granted Yehling’s motion for resentencing, but denied his motion for a new trial.  The court concluded the new evidence offered by Yehling would merely impeach Avril’s testimony and was not likely to result in an acquittal upon retrial because other evidence presented by the government tended to establish Yehling’s guilt.  Yehling was again sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.  Yehling then filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the district court’s delay in ruling on his motion for a new trial deprived the court of jurisdiction and constituted denial of a speedy trial and due process of law.  Yehling filed a notice of appeal before the district court ruled on his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
III.  Discussion
	A.  Sufficiency of the Evidence
	Yehling moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s case-in-chief.  The district court denied the motion, concluding the government had presented sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury.  Yehling did not introduce any evidence in his defense.  Yehling argues the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support his conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.

	In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the record de novo to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  .  We consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, but do not weigh conflicting evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses.  ; .knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainTo prove conspiracy, the government must show (1) two or more personsÏobjective,€obtainagreed to violate the law, (2) the defendant knew the essential objectives of theÏobjective,€obtainconspiracy, (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily participated in theÏobjective,€obtainconspiracy, and (4) the alleged coconspirators were interdependent.  .  Yehling challengesÏobjective,€obtainonly the governmentags proof with respect to the second and fourth elements. knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainTo prove knowledge of the essential objectives of a conspiracy, theÏobjective,€obtaingovernment does not have to show the defendant knew all the details or all theÏobjective,€obtainmembers of a conspiracy.    Rather, the government only needs to demonstrateÏobjective,€obtainthe ªdefendant shared a common purpose or design with his allegedÏobjective,€obtaincoconspirators.an  . Ïobjective,€obtainThe essential objectives of the conspiracy in this case included obtainingÏobjective,€obtainmethamphetamine in California and Colorado and reselling the methamphetamineÏobjective,€obtainfor profit in Ouray County.  The government presented sufficient evidence toÏobjective,€obtainenable a rational juror to find Yehling had knowledge of the first essentialÏobjective,€obtainobjective, obtaining methamphetamine in California and Colorado.  FBI SpecialÏobjective,€obtainAgent Buie testified Yehling admitted to knowing Wherley had made severalÏobjective,€obtaintrips to California with Avril and Sullings to obtain methamphetamine.  YehlingÏobjective,€obtainalso told Buie that Wherley approached him about locating a supplier inÏobjective,€obtainColorado.  A rational juror thus could have found beyond a reasonable doubt thatÏobjective,€obtainYehling knew the conspiracy involved obtaining methamphetamine in CaliforniaÏobjective,€obtainand Colorado.  knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainThe conspiracy also entailed the redistribution of methamphetamineÏobjective,€obtainobtained in California and Colorado to residents of Ouray County.  Therefore, theÏobjective,€obtaingovernment was required to demonstrate Yehling knew Wherley and AvrilÏobjective,€obtainintended to redistribute the methamphetamine they purchased from him, and notÏobjective,€obtainto keep it for personal use.  Although the government did not present any directÏobjective,€obtainevidence regarding Yehlingags knowledge of this objective, the evidence presentedÏobjective,€obtainwas sufficient to permit a rational juror to infer Yehling knew theÏobjective,€obtainmethamphetamine was for distribution.  Avril testified Yehling provided himÏobjective,€obtainwith an eightinball of methamphetamine on a single occasion.  Although thisÏobjective,€obtainquantity is consistent with personal use, the evidence suggests the eightinball wasÏobjective,€obtainmerely a sample and Yehling intended to provide larger quantities in the future. Ïobjective,€obtainWherley testified he originally approached Yehling in an attempt to find a sourceÏobjective,€obtainin Colorado to provide large quantities of methamphetamine.  In a telephoneÏobjective,€obtainconversation intercepted by the FBI shortly after Yehling provided the eightinballÏobjective,€obtainto Avril, Wherley asked Yehling if he had more methamphetamine available. Ïobjective,€obtainYehling indicated he could obtain more the next day, but wanted to ensureÏobjective,€obtaineveryone was satisfied before doing so.  Yehling also told Wherley he wasÏobjective,€obtaininterested in ªturn[ing] over a bunch and make[ing] some dough.an  ROA, Supp.Ïobjective,€obtainVol. III, Ex. 49.  In a subsequent conversation, Yehling and Wherley discussedÏobjective,€obtainthe price for an ounce of methamphetamine.  Wherley testified that four or fiveÏobjective,€obtainpeople could use an ounce of methamphetamine in one week, and indicated heÏobjective,€obtainhad purchased ounce quantities in California which he then cut and packaged asÏobjective,€obtaingram quantities for resale.  Based on this evidence and Yehlingags knowledge thatÏobjective,€obtainWherley had bought and sold methamphetamine in the past, a rational juror couldÏobjective,€obtaininfer Yehling knew the ounce quantities Wherley and Avril were consideringÏobjective,€obtainpurchasing from his source were for distribution.  The government, therefore,Ïobjective,€obtainsubmitted sufficient evidence to prove Yehlingags knowledge of the essentialÏobjective,€obtainobjectives of the conspiracy.  knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainYehling also challenges the sufficiency of the governmentags evidence withÏobjective,€obtainrespect to the element of interdependence.  Interdependence exists when ªeachÏobjective,€obtainalleged coconspirator . . . depend[s] on the successful operation of each ®linkag inÏobjective,€obtainthe chain to achieve the common goal.an  .  In other words, each coconspiratorags ªactions mustÏobjective,€obtainfacilitate the endeavors of other alleged coconspirators or facilitate the venture asÏobjective,€obtaina whole.an   (quotation and alterations omitted).  YehlingÏobjective,€obtaincontends the eightinball he sold to Avril is insufficient to demonstrateÏobjective,€obtaininterdependence when considered in the context of the large quantities ofÏobjective,€obtainmethamphetamine Wherley regularly imported from California.  YehlingagsÏobjective,€obtainargument, however, ignores the evidence suggesting the eightinball was merely aÏobjective,€obtainsample to be followed by larger quantities of methamphetamine in the future.  knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainWherley testified that after several years of traveling to California toÏobjective,€obtainobtain methamphetamine for resale in Colorado, he wanted to locate a supplier inÏobjective,€obtainColorado.  Wherley approached Yehling for assistance.  Yehling found a source,Ïobjective,€obtainintroduced him to Wherley, and supplied samples with the understanding thatÏobjective,€obtainlarger quantities could be purchased in the future.  Because Yehling provided aÏobjective,€obtainpotential local source of methamphetamine that could then be resold by WherleyÏobjective,€obtainand Avril to customers in Ouray County, his actions facilitated the conspiracy. Ïobjective,€obtainEach alleged coconspirator was dependent upon the activities of the otherÏobjective,€obtaincoconspirators to achieve the common goal of distributing methamphetamine forÏobjective,€obtainprofit.  Wherley and Avril relied on Yehling, and others, to provideÏobjective,€obtainmethamphetamine for redistribution.  Yehling in turn relied on Wherley, Avril,Ïobjective,€obtainand the distributors and customers further down the chain to provide a market forÏobjective,€obtainmethamphetamine he provided.  Without the assistance of Wherley, Avril, andÏobjective,€obtainother coconspirators, Yehling would not have had the opportunity to ªturn over aÏobjective,€obtainbunch and make some dough.an  ROA, Supp. Vol. III, Ex. 49.  Finally, theÏobjective,€obtaindistributors and customers in Ouray County were dependent on Wherley, Avril,Ïobjective,€obtainand, further up the chain, Yehling, to provide methamphetamine.  knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainIn establishing interdependence, it is irrelevant that Yehling never actuallyÏobjective,€obtainprovided large quantities of methamphetamine to Wherley for redistribution.  TheÏobjective,€obtainessence of a conspiracy is an agreement to violate the law.  .  Yehlingags failure to provideÏobjective,€obtainlarge quantities of methamphetamine, as planned, did not negate the unlawfulÏobjective,€obtainagreement; it merely made the conspiracy less successful than it might otherwiseÏobjective,€obtainhave been because Wherley and Avril were required to locate another localÏobjective,€obtainsource or distribute less methamphetamine.  Based on the evidence presented byÏobjective,€obtainthe government, a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt thatÏobjective,€obtainthe alleged coconspirators were interdependent.  Therefore, Yehlingags convictionÏobjective,€obtainfor conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distributeÏobjective,€obtainmethamphetamine is supported by sufficient evidence.   knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainB.  Unreasonable Delay Claimsknowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainYehling also argues the district courtags fourinyear delay in ruling on hisÏobjective,€obtainmotion for a new trial deprived the district court of jurisdiction and constitutedÏobjective,€obtaindenial of a speedy trial and due process of law.  He asks this court to reverse hisÏobjective,€obtainconviction and vacate his sentence.  knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainWe first address Yehlingags jurisdictional claim.  Jurisdictional questionsÏobjective,€obtainare reviewed de novo.  . Ïobjective,€obtainIn support of his claim that the district court lost jurisdiction over his caseÏobjective,€obtainbecause of its delay in ruling on his motion for a new trial, Yehling cites a singleÏobjective,€obtainColorado state court case.  See . Ïobjective,€obtainThe defendant in Grundel pleaded guilty to gambling and was sentenced threeÏobjective,€obtainyears later.  The appellate court dismissed the charges, concluding ª[i]n theÏobjective,€obtainabsence of a permissive statute, the indefinite postponement of sentence uponÏobjective,€obtainone convicted of crime deprives the court of jurisdiction to pronounce sentence atÏobjective,€obtaina subsequent term.an  .  We express no opinion regarding the holdingÏobjective,€obtainof Grundel because it is inapposite here.  The district court imposed YehlingagsÏobjective,€obtainsentence four months after he was found guilty.  During the pendency ofÏobjective,€obtainYehlingags motion for a new trial, a valid, final sentence existed.  Thus, inÏobjective,€obtaincontrast to Grundel, Yehlingags sentence was not indefinitely postponed.  YehlingÏobjective,€obtainhas not cited, and we cannot find, any authority for the proposition that a districtÏobjective,€obtaincourt loses jurisdiction as a result of delay in deciding a motion for a new trialÏobjective,€obtainafter the defendant has been sentenced.  We therefore reject YehlingagsÏobjective,€obtainjurisdictional claim.  knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainYehling also contends the district courtags delay deprived him of a speedyÏobjective,€obtaintrial and due process of law.  In evaluating claims of unreasonable delay inÏobjective,€obtaincriminal cases, we review questions of law de novo and questions of fact for clearÏobjective,€obtainerror.  ; see alsoÏobjective,€obtain.  Yehling raised hisÏobjective,€obtainspeedy trial and due process claims for the first time in a motion to dismiss forÏobjective,€obtainlack of jurisdiction after the district court denied his motion for a new trial. Ïobjective,€obtainYehling then filed a notice of appeal, depriving the district court of jurisdictionÏobjective,€obtainbefore it ruled on his motion to dismiss.  We generally do not consider issues onÏobjective,€obtainappeal that were not ruled on below.  .  Under the unique facts presented here, however, we need not remand theÏobjective,€obtaincase to the district court to address Yehlingags unreasonable delay claims in theÏobjective,€obtainfirst instance.  Even accepting Yehlingags allegations as true, he has notÏobjective,€obtaindemonstrated a speedy trial or due process violation.knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainThe Sixth Amendment guarantees all criminal defendants the right to aÏobjective,€obtainspeedy trial; we have applied this right from arrest through sentencing.  ; see .  Protection against unreasonable delay in the appellateÏobjective,€obtainprocess is similarly provided by the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law. Ïobjective,€obtainSee  (applying,Ïobjective,€obtainthrough Fourteenth Amendment, right to due process when state delayedÏobjective,€obtainprosecution of habeas petitioner).  Yehlingags claim, however, does not fitÏobjective,€obtainsquarely into either of these categories.  The delay in this case occurred afterÏobjective,€obtainYehlingags sentence was imposed, but before he filed a notice of appeal. Ïobjective,€obtainNevertheless, the interests protected by preventing unreasonable delay from arrestÏobjective,€obtainthrough sentencing and throughout the appellate process are also endangered byÏobjective,€obtaindelay in deciding a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Ïobjective,€obtainFaded memories or misplaced evidence may impair a defendantags ability toÏobjective,€obtainadequately defend himself if he is granted a new trial.  See .  Delay may also produce anxiety or drain aÏobjective,€obtaindefendantags financial resources.  . Ïobjective,€obtainBecause of these similarities, we see no reason to exempt a motion for a new trialÏobjective,€obtainbased on newly discovered evidence from protection against unreasonable delay. Ïobjective,€obtainWe therefore examine the delay in this case to determine if it rises to the level ofÏobjective,€obtaina constitutional violation.  knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainIn Barker, the Supreme Court established a balancing test to determineÏobjective,€obtainwhether a particular delay violates a defendantags right to a speedy trial.  .  The Court identified four factors that should be assessed and balanced:Ïobjective,€obtain(1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendantags assertionÏobjective,€obtainof his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.    None of the factors areÏobjective,€obtainnecessary or sufficient; rather, the factors are related and should be consideredÏobjective,€obtaintogether with other relevant circumstances.  .  Although BarkerÏobjective,€obtainaddressed only a defendantags right to a speedy trial, this court subsequentlyÏobjective,€obtainadopted the Barker analysis in determining whether a defendantags due processÏobjective,€obtainright to a timely direct criminal appeal in state court had been violated.  .  Because the Barker test also provides an appropriateÏobjective,€obtainframework to evaluate delay in deciding a motion for a new trial based on newlyÏobjective,€obtaindiscovered evidence, we apply it in assessing Yehlingags claim.knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainThe first factor, length of delay, functions as a ªtriggering mechanism.an Ïobjective,€obtain.  The remaining factors are examined only if the delayÏobjective,€obtainis long enough to be presumptively prejudicial.    Yehling filed his motion forÏobjective,€obtaina new trial on December 4, 2001.  The government filed its response onÏobjective,€obtainDecember 26, 2001.  The district court denied Yehlingags motion three years andÏobjective,€obtaineight months later.  Although there is no definitive number of months or yearsÏobjective,€obtainthat will trigger consideration of the remaining Barker factors, the delay of threeÏobjective,€obtainyears and eight months in this case is presumptively prejudicial.  See  (observing pretrial delayÏobjective,€obtainapproaching one year sufficient to trigger Barker analysis for determining speedyÏobjective,€obtaintrial violation);  (concluding twoinyear delay inÏobjective,€obtainadjudicating direct criminal appeal gives rise to presumption of inordinate delay);Ïobjective,€obtain (stating fifteeninmonth delay in sentencing was sufficientÏobjective,€obtainto require inquiry into remaining Barker factors).  Thus, we must examine theÏobjective,€obtainremaining Barker factors.  Moreover, because the delay here was substantial andÏobjective,€obtainYehlingags motion for a new trial did not raise complex legal or factual issues, theÏobjective,€obtainlength of delay weighs in Yehlingags favor.  ao31Ïobjective,€obtain(observing complexity of case may affect reasonableness of delay).  knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainThe second factor, the reason for the delay, ªweighs against theÏobjective,€obtaingovernment in proportion to the degree to which the government caused theÏobjective,€obtaindelay.an  .  Purposeful delay weighs heavily against theÏobjective,€obtaingovernment.  .  ªA more neutral reason such as negligenceÏobjective,€obtainor overcrowded courts [is] weighted less heavily but nevertheless should beÏobjective,€obtainconsidered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest withÏobjective,€obtainthe government rather than with the defendant.an    Yehling does not allege anyÏobjective,€obtainattempt at intentional delay by the government; rather, he acknowledges the delayÏobjective,€obtainin this case was the result of negligence.  Thus, this factor also weighs inÏobjective,€obtainYehlingags favor, but not heavily.  knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainThe third factor assesses whether a defendant asserted his right toÏobjective,€obtainadjudication without unreasonable delay.    In Barker, the Supreme CourtÏobjective,€obtainrejected the contention that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial waivesÏobjective,€obtainthe right.  .  The Court also declined to adopt the antithetical view thatÏobjective,€obtaina defendant has no duty to assert the right.    Instead, the Court determined aÏobjective,€obtaindefendantags assertion of, or failure to assert, his right to a speedy trial is merelyÏobjective,€obtainone factor to be considered in determining whether the right has been violated. Ïobjective,€obtain knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainYehling filed motions in March 2004 and 2005 seeking permission fromÏobjective,€obtainthe district court to travel to Cozumel and Boston, respectively.  Both motionsÏobjective,€obtainindicated Yehling had filed a motion for a new trial on December 4, 2001, andÏobjective,€obtainthe motion was still pending before the district court.  Neither motion, however,Ïobjective,€obtainasserted Yehlingags right to a timely decision on his motion for a new trial orÏobjective,€obtainrequested that the district court rule on the motion without further delay.  SeeÏobjective,€obtain (observing defendantags failure to file a formal motionÏobjective,€obtainrequesting sentencing was indicative of defendantags acquiescence in fifteeninmonth delay); see also .  In fact, Yehling did not file aÏobjective,€obtainmotion asserting his right to a decision without unreasonable delay until after theÏobjective,€obtaindistrict court had denied his motion for a new trial.  A defendantags burden toÏobjective,€obtainactively assert his right ªis not satisfied merely by moving to dismiss after theÏobjective,€obtaindelay has already occurred.an  .  The third factor thusÏobjective,€obtainweighs against Yehling.knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainThe final Barker factor analyzes prejudice to the defendant resulting fromÏobjective,€obtainthe delay.  .  Prejudice is assessed in light of theÏobjective,€obtaininterests the speedy trial and due process rights were designed to protect:Ïobjective,€obtainpreventing oppressive incarceration, minimizing anxiety and concern of theÏobjective,€obtaindefendant, and limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired.  .  We observed in Perez that once a defendant has been convicted, the rightsÏobjective,€obtainof society increase in proportion to the rights of the defendant.  . Ïobjective,€obtainPostinconviction prejudice therefore ªmust be substantial and demonstrable.an    knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainYehling was free on a personal recognizance bond during the pendency ofÏobjective,€obtainhis motion for a new trial.  Nevertheless, he asserts the delay interfered with hisÏobjective,€obtainpersonal liberty because he was under the supervision of federal probationÏobjective,€obtainofficials and subject to drug screening.  Although Yehling was subject toÏobjective,€obtainsupervision during the pendency of his motion, he was able to maintain stableÏobjective,€obtainemployment, marry, and purchase a home.  Moreover, on the only two occasionsÏobjective,€obtainYehling sought permission from the district court to leave the state of Colorado,Ïobjective,€obtainit was granted.  Thus, his liberty was not greatly restricted.  See  (identifying prevention of oppressive incarceration as interest protected byÏobjective,€obtainright to speedy trial). knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainYehling also asserts he suffered anxiety because of the delay in resolutionÏobjective,€obtainof his motion for a new trial.  To establish prejudice as a result of anxiety, aÏobjective,€obtaindefendant must make a particularized and substantial showing of anxietyÏobjective,€obtaindistinguishable from anxiety suffered by other similarly situated defendants. Ïobjective,€obtain.  Even assuming Yehling suffered anxiety, he has notÏobjective,€obtainalleged particular or substantial anxiety that makes his situation different fromÏobjective,€obtainthat of other defendants awaiting a decision on a motion for a new trial.  TheÏobjective,€obtainfacts of this case are similar to Barker.  .  The defendant in BarkerÏobjective,€obtainspent ten months in jail awaiting trial before being released on bond.  . Ïobjective,€obtainThe defendant remained free on bond for over three years before he was finallyÏobjective,€obtaintried and convicted.    In assessing the defendantags speedy trial claim, theÏobjective,€obtainCourt acknowledged the defendant suffered some prejudice by living ªunder aÏobjective,€obtaincloud of suspicion and anxietyan for over four years.    The Court, however,Ïobjective,€obtainconcluded the ªprejudice was minimalan in light of the defendantags failure toÏobjective,€obtainallege the delay impaired his defense.    Because Yehlingags alleged prejudiceÏobjective,€obtainis similarly minimal, he has failed to make the required showing of substantialÏobjective,€obtainprejudice.  Thus, the fourth factor weighs against Yehling.  knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainAlthough the first two Barker factors«length of delay and reason for theÏobjective,€obtaindelay«weigh in favor of finding a constitutional violation in this case, the lastÏobjective,€obtaintwo factors do not.  Yehling did not timely assert his right to a decision withoutÏobjective,€obtainunreasonable delay, and he failed to allege particularized and substantialÏobjective,€obtainprejudice resulting from the delay.  Though none of the Barker factors areÏobjective,€obtaindispositive, the Supreme Court has observed a defendantags assertion of his rightÏobjective,€obtaincarries strong weight in determining whether the right was actually violatedÏobjective,€obtainbecause ª[t]he more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is toÏobjective,€obtaincomplain.an  .  Additionally, we have indicated theÏobjective,€obtainnecessity of showing substantial prejudice dominates the Barker balancing testÏobjective,€obtainonce a defendant has been convicted.  .  Because the firstÏobjective,€obtainand second Barker factors do not compensate for Yehlingags failure to timelyÏobjective,€obtainassert his right or allege substantial prejudice, Yehling has failed to establish theÏobjective,€obtaindelay deprived him of a speedy trial or due process of law.knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainknowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainknowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainYehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainIV.  Conclusionknowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainto€find€Yehling€had€knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtainFor the foregoing reasons, Yehlingags unreasonable delay claims areÏobjective,€obtainDENIED and his conviction is AFFIRMED.  knowledge€of€the€first€essentialÏobjective,€obtain