When Mr. Smith filed suit against the federal defendants, he had no litigation pending in the Tenth Circuit. The focus of his challenge to this court's use of unpublished decisions was the unfavorable disposition, by unpublished order and judgment, of his prior appeal regarding the constitutionality of the state bar admission process. The proper means for objecting to the non-publication of that decision would have been by petition for rehearing in this court and/or petition for certiorari review by the Supreme Court.⁽⁴⁾ Instead, he has sought our review of this prior action by generating an entirely new stream of litigation. Although it is possible that this present case could ultimately result in an unpublished decision, this mere possibility is too speculative to support jurisdiction under Article III. Nova Health Sys., 416 F.3d at 1155; Essence, Inc. v. City of Fed. Heights, 285 F.3d 1272, 1282 (10th Cir. 2002); Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 211 F.3d 515, 520-21 (10th Cir. 2000). Thus, we conclude, neither a collateral challenge relating to Mr. Smith's prior unsuccessful appeal, nor an anticipatory challenge relating to a potential unpublished disposition in this litigation suffices to establish an actual injury that would permit review and redress. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Mr. Smith's claims for lack of standing.

We point out that the alleged injury caused by our circuit publication rules need not consistently evade review. Other circuits have addressed the validity of their non-publication rules in cases where the question of the rule's validity arose in the context of litigation presently before the court. For example, courts have considered the constitutionality of publication rules where an unpublished decision relevant to the merits of an appeal was pressed by a litigant who insisted it be deemed binding precedent contrary to the circuit rule, see Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2002), or was opposed by a litigant who insisted it be disregarded pursuant to the circuit rule, see Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot on reh'g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). Such rules have also been scrutinized where an attorney violated a circuit rule prohibiting citation to non-precedential decisions and sought to avoid proposed disciplinary action by challenging the validity of the rule. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2001). As demonstrated in these cases, a circuit non-publication rule may be challenged in the circuit court when application of the rule in a live proceeding before that court directly implicates the interest of a party or counsel in that proceeding. Such is not the case here.

The state trial court held it lacked jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims stemming from the denial of Mr. Smith's admission to the bar because jurisdiction to hear such claims was lodged exclusively with the Colorado Supreme Court. Mr. Smith sought mandamus relief from the federal district court to compel the state trial judge's consideration of his constitutional claims. The district court summarily rejected his claim for lack of jurisdiction under Olson v. Hart, 965 F.2d 940, 942 (10th Cir. 1992), which held that "[f]ederal courts have no authority to issue a writ of mandamus to a state judge." Although he acknowledges this limitation on the authority of federal courts, Mr. Smith argues the district court erred in not construing his mandamus request as a claim for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Olson, 965 F.2d at 943 ("We may also construe a pro se petition for a writ of mandamus as an action for . . . declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."). We noted in Olson, however, that "section 1983 injunctive relief is available" only if "appellant can show he was deprived of a federal right." Id.

In Olson, the plaintiff alleged the state court judge, out of spite, refused to sign a journal entry necessary to the exercise of his right to appeal. We held, if the allegation were true, the judge's arbitrary and capricious action would violate the plaintiff's due process rights and present a cognizable § 1983 claim. Id. Here, Mr. Smith has requested mandamus relief claiming that the state trial court erred by limiting its jurisdiction in accordance with state law precedent, see People v. Buckles, 453 P.2d 404 (Colo. 1968); Colo. Sup. Ct. Grievance Comm. v. Dist. Ct., 850 P.2d 150, 154 (Colo. 1993), and failing to consider claims that his denial of admission to the bar violated his constitutional rights. Although he contends the state court has refused to entertain his federal claims in violation of the Supremacy Clause, we note that the state courts have not shut their doors to federal claims but have simply restricted challenges to individual bar admission decisions to Colorado Supreme Court jurisdiction. Mr. Smith directs us to no precedent establishing that Colorado violated his federal rights by vesting exclusive jurisdiction of the regulation of lawyers in its Supreme Court. Accordingly, we decline to recast his request for mandamus as a § 1983 claim and we adhere to our general prohibition on issuing a writ of mandamus to a state court judge.

Based on the foregoing analysis, we hold that the district court properly dismissed all of the claims asserted in the actions consolidated in this appeal.⁽⁵⁾ Finally, we DENY the several motions that remain pending because none of them affects our analysis of either case or warrants relief in any collateral respect.

We AFFIRM the judgments of the district court.

^*. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

^1. Because the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, several circuit judges, and a district judge in the circuit are named defendants in the action challenging this court's publication practice, plaintiff has moved for recusal of all Tenth Circuit judges and designation of a hearing panel from another circuit. Given "there are no pertinent, particularized allegations of bias," we apply our general rule that, notwithstanding the inclusion of Tenth Circuit judges in the caption, "neither this court nor this panel . . . is disqualified from hearing and resolving this case." Switzer v. Coan, 261 F.3d 985, 987 n.1 (10th Cir. 2001) (brackets, quotation marks and citations omitted). Indeed, it seems peculiarly unfitting for one circuit's procedural rules and practices to be governed by judges from another circuit. Such matters are, of course, subject to the judgment of the Supreme Court, which has wide-ranging authority through both case-specific review and its general supervisory power "to intervene to protect the integrity of the federal system." 32 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Courts § 473 (discussing authority regarding Supreme Court's supervisory power).

^2. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the only federal court with jurisdiction to review state court judgments is the Supreme Court. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005) (discussing Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983), and Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-16 (1923)).

^3. Mr. Smith does not claim the state practice has prevented him from relying on any unpublished decisions supporting a favorable result in his case, which was the basis for a similar challenge to a federal non-publication rule in Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).

^4. In fact, Mr. Smith filed a petition for rehearing in which he argued that this court had deviated from precedent in its decision and then stated, in passing, that "he ha[d] a right to insist that it do so in a published opinion with precedential value," Smith v. Mullarkey, No. 02-1481, Petition for Rehearing, at 1. He also noted the unpublished nature of this court's decision in the petition for mandamus and/or prohibition he filed in the Supreme Court. In neither instance, however, did he argue that the use of unpublished decisions was unconstitutional.

^5. There are vague and conclusory references in Mr. Smith's briefing to an asserted tort liability of defendant Salazar, former Colorado Attorney General. Neither these references nor the underlying pleadings in the case remotely establish the existence of a cognizable claim.

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