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| IN RE LARRY LEE WOODY,
Debtor.
LARRY LEE WOODY, |
No. 06-3294 |
Kenneth Michael Gay, Consumer Advocate, L.L.C., Lenexa, Kansas,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
The DOJ argues that the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that it would be unconscionable to deny Mr. Woody a discharge of his HEAL loan debt. We agree. Under the correct standard for dischargeability, Mr. Woody failed to demonstrate that nondischarge of his HEAL loan would be unconscionable. We therefore REVERSE the BAP's judgment affirming the bankruptcy court's discharge of Mr. Woody's HEAL loan and order the full amount of his remaining HEAL loan obligation reinstated.
Mr. Woody accrued significant debt from two types of government-insured student loans he obtained between 1979 and 1983 as he pursued a degree in chiropractic medicine. Of his original loan obligations, $25,000 consisted of general educational loans whose dischargeability is governed by the Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8) (the "523 loans"), and $4,700 consisted of a HEAL loan subject to a separate dischargeability standard under 42 U.S.C. 292f(g).(1) Mr. Woody's loan payments began to come due after he left his chiropractic studies in 1983; however, to date, he has contributed only $995 towards the repayment of his 523 loans and only one payment of $484.48 toward his HEAL loan. As a result of accrued interest and his failure to make regular payments on these loans, as of July 2005 Mr. Woody owed a total of over $53,000 on the 523 loans (with interest continuing to accrue at 7% annually) and over $18,750 on the HEAL loan (with interest accruing at 4.55% annually).
Mr. Woody holds an undergraduate degree in accounting. However, he never completed his chiropractic degree and, as a result, has never worked as a chiropractor. After discontinuing his chiropractic studies in 1983, he worked in mostly temporary and seasonal positions, generally earning less than $15,000 annually and collecting unemployment benefits at times. In 2001, he obtained seasonal employment with the I.R.S., and between 2001 and 2004, his annual gross income increased from $17,428 to $27,143.(2) In 2004, he accepted a full-time position at the I.R.S., and his annual gross income increased accordingly to an estimated $36,780 in 2005 and $38,520 in 2006.(3) In his current I.R.S. position, Mr. Woody receives subsidized health insurance as well as access to a flexible medical spending account (an "FSA") and a 401(k) retirement plan.
The bankruptcy court set out a detailed estimated monthly budget of Mr. Woody's expenses for 2005 and 2006, based on his testimony and an overview of the record. The court found that Mr. Woody had an estimated gross monthly income of $3,065 in 2005, and of $3,210 in 2006. The court also found that the following expenses were deducted from his paycheck each month:
2005 2006
Taxes and Social Security $655.00 $700.00
Insurance 137.00 163.00
Flexible Spending Account 72.00 125.00
Federal Retirement 24.00 26.00
401(k) 210.00 221.00
Union Dues 26.00 26.00
TSP Loan 85.00 85.00
TOTAL: $1,209.00 $1,346.00
Factoring in these deductions from his paycheck, Mr. Woody's estimated take-home pay each month was $1,856 in 2005, and $1,864 in 2006. The court also described Mr. Woody's estimated monthly living expenses, culled from documents he submitted to the court:
2005 2006
Apartment Rent $585.00 $595.00
[Storage Rental] 125.00 125.00
Electricity 50.00 55.00
Natural Gas 0.00 0.00
Water/Sewer 20.00 20.00
Cable/Satellite/Internet 17.00 17.00
Telephone 80.00 80.00
Food 200.00 200.00
Clothing/Bedding 30.00 30.00
Laundry 25.00 25.00
Medical & Dental After Reimbursement 128.00 75.00
Personal Grooming 13.00 15.00
Recreation/Entertainment 75.00 95.00
Car Payment 125.00 125.00
Gasoline 80.00 90.00
Auto Repairs/Maintenance 70.00 70.00
Auto Insurance/Road Service 42.00 42.00
Auto Licenses/Personal Property Tax 6.00 6.00
Renter's Insurance 15.00 15.00
Health/Dental/Vision Insurance 60.00 60.00
Charitable Contributions 25.00 25.00
Office Supplies/Bank Charges 17.00 20.00
Interest Expense 9.00 0.00
Union Dues 4.00 0.00
Installment/Credit Card Payments 100.00 0.00
TOTAL: $1,901.00 $1,785.00
Based on this budget, Mr. Woody earned an insufficient amount to cover his monthly expenses in 2005, but managed to earn a meager surplus of $79 per month in 2006.
Mr. Woody was 58 years old at the time of his bankruptcy proceedings in 2005 and had saved what the bankruptcy court characterized as "a pittance" towards his future retirement expenses.(4) He owned no real property, and his only personal property of significant value was a fifteen-year-old pickup truck with a rebuilt engine. The state of Mr. Woody's health was not exemplary: he has heart disease and suffered a heart attack in 2000 which cost approximately $67,000 in medical expenses and precipitated his filing for bankruptcy.
In 2002, Mr. Woody filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and sought discharge of all of his student loan obligations. On July 12, 2005, the bankruptcy court held a hearing to determine the dischargeability of the 523 loans and the HEAL loan. Discharge of 523 loans is governed by the "undue hardship" standard at 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8), which provides that such loans may not be discharged "unless excepting such debt from discharge . . . would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents . . . ." (Emphasis added). In contrast, discharge of the HEAL loan is governed by the unconscionability standard at 42 U.S.C. 292f(g):
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law, a debt that is a loan insured under the [HEAL loan program] may be released by a discharge in bankruptcy under any chapter of Title 11, only if such discharge is granted - -
(1) after the expiration of the seven-year period beginning on the first date when repayment of such loan is required, exclusive of any period after such date in which the obligation to pay installments on the loan is suspended;
(2) upon a finding by the Bankruptcy Court that the nondischarge of such debt would be unconscionable; and
(3) upon the condition that the Secretary shall not have waived the Secretary's rights to apply subsection (f) of this section to the borrower and the discharged debt.(5)
(Emphasis added). The parties stipulated that parts (1) and (3) of 292f(g) were satisfied; thus, the only question before the bankruptcy court regarding the HEAL loan was whether nondischarge of the loan would be unconscionable.
Addressing discharge of Mr. Woody's 523 loan first, the court noted that the Tenth Circuit has adopted the Second Circuit's three-part Brunner test defining "undue hardship." Educ. Credit Mgmt. Co. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2004) (adopting the reasoning of Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987)). The Brunner test holds that the "undue hardship" standard requires a debtor to prove:
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a "minimal" standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loans;
(2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans; and
(3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans.
Polleys, 356 F.3d at 1307. Based on the Brunner factors, the court extensively analyzed Mr. Woody's income and expenses and concluded that he would suffer undue hardship if his 523 loans were not discharged. The court found that Mr. Woody "barely maintains a minimal standard of living" in light of his current budget; his financial condition was likely to persist, as his "future holds greater hardship as his earning capacity diminishes and his medical expenses increase"; and he "has been trying his best in good faith to maximize his personal and professional resources, but . . . circumstances beyond his control have kept him from repaying his student loans." The court therefore ordered discharge of Mr. Woody's 523 loan debts, including accrued interest.
The bankruptcy court then conducted a much shorter analysis of whether 292f(g)'s unconscionability standard permitted discharge of Mr. Woody's $18,750 of accrued HEAL loan debt. The court noted that "many of this Court's findings under the Brunner test are equally applicable under an 'unconscionability' analysis," and therefore its discussion of the HEAL loan reiterated many points the court made in regard to the 523 loan discharge. Indeed, the headings in the court's discussion of the HEAL loan mirrored the three Brunner factors for "undue hardship," focusing on Mr. Woody's "[a]ccumulated wealth, income and ability to pay," his "[a]ge, health, prospects and efforts for increased earnings," and his "good faith" in finding that nondischarge of his HEAL loan debt would be unconscionable. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court concluded that "Mr. Woody has satisfied his burden and is entitled to discharge, in their entirety, both the 523 Loan and the HEAL Loan."(6)
The United States Department of Education ("DOE") as creditor on the 523 loans, along with the DOJ as creditor on the HEAL loan, both appealed from the bankruptcy court's order. On appeal, the BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court's reasoning in its entirety and upheld the discharge of both the 523 loans and the HEAL loan.
Only the DOJ filed an appeal from the BAP's opinion affirming the bankruptcy court's order; thus, only the discharge of Mr. Woody's HEAL loan is at issue in this appeal. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 158(d).
This court has not previously addressed the unconscionability standard for
discharge of HEAL loans under 42 U.S.C. 292f(g). The Fourth and Sixth
Circuits, however, have addressed this standard and have provided a well-considered analytical
framework for determining when discharge of a HEAL loan
is permitted under 292f(g)'s strict language. We join our sister circuits in
adopting this framework, which involves analysis of the totality of the debtor's
circumstances. It is clear that Congress intended to invoke a stricter standard for
discharge of HEAL loans than for the discharge of 523 loans. While we agree
that Mr. Woody faces an uncertain financial future after his retirement, his
present level of income and his apparent lack of repayment efforts over the life of
the HEAL loan despite the availability of funds from which at least minimal
payments could have been made convince us that he does not qualify for
292f(g)'s rigorous discharge standard. We therefore reverse the BAP's judgment
and the bankruptcy court's order discharging his outstanding HEAL loan
obligations.
Although this appeal is from a decision by the BAP, our focus on review is
upon the bankruptcy court's decision. In re Alderete, 412 F.3d 1200, 1204 (10th
Cir. 2005); accord In re Midkiff, 342 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 2003). We
review the bankruptcy court's factual findings for clear error. In re Commercial
Fin. Servs., Inc., 427 F.3d 804, 810 (10th Cir. 2005). However, we review de
novo the bankruptcy court's resolution of questions of law, including the
meaning of the term "unconscionable." See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs. v. Smitley, 347 F.3d 109, 116 (4th Cir. 2003); see also In re
Midkiff, 342
F.3d at 1197 ("Where . . . [t]here are no factual disputes and the issues on appeal
pertain to the proper application of bankruptcy statutes and the interpretation of
case law, our review is de novo."(alterations in original)).
It has now been more than ten years since the Sixth Circuit became the first
federal court of appeals to consider 292f(g)'s unconscionability standard for
discharge of HEAL loans. See In re Rice, 78 F.3d 1144 (6th Cir. 1996). That
court's analytical framework was drawn from the prevailing approach of district
and bankruptcy courts, see In re Barrows, 182 B.R. 640, 650 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1994); In re Malloy, 155 B.R. 940, 945 (E.D. Va. 1993); In re Emnettt, 127
B.R.
599, 602 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1991), and has since been adopted by the only other
circuit court to consider the issue, see Smitley, 347 F3d at 116-17. We find the
approach of these courts reasonable and we therefore join them in applying a
"totality of the circumstances" approach to the discharge of a HEAL loan
pursuant to 292f(g).
In requiring that HEAL loans may only be discharged when "the
nondischarge of such debt would be unconscionable," Congress did not provide a
definition of unconscionability. 42 U.S.C. 292f(g). Courts interpreting this
requirement have therefore applied the Supreme Court's maxim that "[i]n the
absence of an indication to the contrary, words in a statute are assumed to bear
their 'ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.'" Smitley, 347 F.3d at 116
(quoting Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207 (1997)
(alteration in original)); see In re Rice, 78 F.3d at 1149. As such,
"unconscionable" has been defined as "excessive," "exorbitant," "lying outside
the limits of what is reasonable or acceptable," "shockingly unfair, harsh, or
unjust," or "outrageous." Smitley, 347 F.3d at 116 (quoting Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 2486 (1993)); In re Rice, 78 F.3d at 1149; see
also
Matthews v. Pineo, 19 F.3d 121, 124 (3d Cir. 1994) (adopting an identical
definition of "unconscionable" as applied in a statute regulating discharge of
other federally insured loans).
Other courts are also unanimous in finding "the standard imposed by this
definition of 'unconscionability' to be significantly more stringent than the
'undue hardship' standard established for the discharge" of 523 loans. In re
Rice, 78 F.3d at 1149; accord Smitley, 347 F.3d at 116-17; United
States v.
Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1583 (7th Cir. 1991). Further, courts are similarly
unanimous that the burden to show unconscionability is a heavy one and is placed
squarely upon the debtor. Smitley, 347 F.3d at 117; In re Rice, 78 F.3d at
1149.
With these principles in mind, it is apparent that a single test cannot
reasonably take into account all of the considerations relevant to a determination
of unconscionability in every case. Thus, we agree with the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits that "bankruptcy courts should examine the totality of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the debtor and the obligation to determine whether
nondischarge of the obligation would be unconscionable." In re Rice, 78 F.3d at
1149; accord Smitley, 347 F.3d at 117. Factors which these courts have
recognized as relevant in this analysis include (1) the debtor's "income, earning
ability, health, educational background, dependents, age, accumulated wealth,
and professional degree," In re Rice, 78 F.3d at 1149; (2) the debtor's "claimed
expenses and standard of living, with a view toward ascertaining whether the
debtor has attempted to minimize the expenses of himself and his dependents,"
id.; (3) whether the debtor's "current situation is likely to continue or improve,"
including "whether the debtor has attempted to maximize his income by seeking
or obtaining stable employment commensurate with his educational background
and abilities," and "whether the debtor is capable of supplementing his income
through secondary part-time or seasonal employment," even if already employed
full time, id. at 1149-50; (4) whether the debtor's dependents "are, or could be,
contributing financially to their own support," id. at 1150; (5) the amount of the
debt and the rate at which interest accrues, id. at 1149; and finally, (6) the
debtor's "good faith," i.e. his role in allowing the debt to accrue including
"previous efforts to repay the HEAL obligation, including the debtor's financial
situation over the course of time when payments were due; the debtor's voluntary
undertaking of additional financial burdens despite his knowledge of his
outstanding HEAL debt; and the percentage of the debtor's total indebtedness
represented by student loans," id. at 1150.
This list, of course, is not exclusive, and bankruptcy courts should consider
any additional factors arising in a given case that affect the determination of
whether nondischarge would be shockingly unfair, harsh, or unjust, or otherwise
unconscionable. In addition, we recognize the concern expressed by the
dissenting judge in Smitley and the bankruptcy court in this case that lists of
relevant factors can sometimes obscure the true function of a totality of the
circumstances analysis by reducing it to a "rigid, formula-driven calculation."
Smitley, 347 F.3d at 125 (Michael, J., dissenting); see Polleys, 356
F.3d at 1309
("Legal rules have value only to the extent they guide primary conduct or the
exercise of judicial discretion. Laundry lists, which may show ingenuity in
imagining what could be relevant but do not assign weights or consequences to
the factors, flunk the test of utility."). We caution, therefore, that courts should
take care to view the debtor's situation as a whole, assigning more importance to
those factors the court determines to carry greater weight in a given debtor's
circumstances.
Nevertheless, a court may not utilize its discretion to overcome Congress's
requirement that debtors seeking discharge of HEAL loans meet a strict
unconscionability standard. "Given the extreme nature of Congress' chosen
standard for the discharge of HEAL loans, we believe that in all but the most
difficult cases the question of whether the debtor has satisfied that standard will
be obvious." In re Rice, 78 F.3d at 1150; see also id. at 1148 ("[W]e
have little
doubt that [Congress] intended to severely restrict the circumstances under which
a HEAL loan could be discharged in bankruptcy.").
Consistent with the approach set out above, in this section we consider
individually the factors related to Mr. Woody's situation that we find relevant to
whether nondischarge of his HEAL loan would be unconscionable. We then
synthesize these factors to address the totality of the circumstances in the
following section. By doing so, we have endeavored to ensure that our analysis
is tailored to Mr. Woody's situation as a whole and not merely a "rigid, formula-driven
calculation." Smitley, 347 F.3d at 125 (Michael, J. dissenting).
Mr. Woody's financial situation, both currently and over the years since his
loan payments first became due, carries great weight in determining whether his
HEAL loan may be discharged. The bankruptcy court found that, although Mr.
Woody's income varied in the past, it has increased markedly since he became
employed by the I.R.S. in 2001; from an annual income that exceeded $15,000 in
only a few years prior to 1998, Mr. Woody's earnings have steadily increased,
reaching a projected gross income of $36,780 in 2005 and $38,520 in 2006. Mr.
Woody also receives significant benefits from the I.R.S. in addition to his salary,
including subsidized health insurance, 401(k) and TSP retirement savings
programs, and access to a flexible spending account for his medical expenses.
As for Mr. Woody's educational background, he holds a bachelor's degree
with a major in accounting and a minor in general business. His undergraduate
education has apparently proven useful, at least in the later years of his
professional life, as his successful employment with the I.R.S. appears to utilize
the training and skills of his degree. He has not, however, accumulated
significant wealth or many possessions; his retirement accounts contain
approximately $10,000, he owns no real estate, and his sole personal possession
of any value is his fifteen-year-old pickup truck.
We therefore observe that Mr. Woody appears to have an adequate earning
capacity at present; with no dependents to support, he is able to utilize his entire
annual income of nearly $40,000 to provide for his own needs. We recognize,
however, that these circumstances have not always existed, and specifically
recognize that, prior to 1998, Mr. Woody earned significantly less than he did at
the time of the bankruptcy court's judgment.
Another important factor in our calculus is the fact that Mr. Woody is
approaching retirement age and suffers from a heart condition. Mr. Woody was
58 years old at the time of his bankruptcy trial, which would make him now
closer to 60. As the bankruptcy court noted, he "is not a shining example of
good health," as he has heart disease and "the medical fall-out associated with a
recent heart attack." Mr. Woody also testified that he has conditions affecting
use of his feet and hands, although these are not so significant as to prevent him
from working.
His age and health conditions separate Mr. Woody from the debtors in Rice
and Smitley, who were aged 41 and 47 respectively and were thus "relatively
young as well as healthy." In re Rice, 78 F.3d at 1150; Smitley, 347 F.3d at
122.
On the other hand, Mr. Woody's health is not presently so impaired as to
interfere with his ability to maintain full time employment at the I.R.S.; the
bankruptcy court found that Mr. Woody is able to work and his job does not
exacerbate his health issues, although he cannot work overtime without risking
adverse health effects. See In re Barrows, 182 B.R. at 647-49 (noting debtor's
numerous physical problems, but refusing to discharge student loans including
HEAL loans because "not only must the debtor's physical, mental or financial
limitations be permanent, they must be severe enough to prevent the obtainment
of employment."); In re Soler, 261 B.R. 444, 460-64 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2001)
(discharging debtor's HEAL loans, in part because chronic, acute back pain was
exacerbated by her job as a dentist and meant that she could not work more hours
or hope to increase her income); In re Kline, 155 B.R. 762, 768 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1993) (discharging debtor's HEAL loans, in part because of severe mental
illness "which render[ed] her unable to function on a day-to-day basis and
prevent[ed] her from maintaining employment for any significant time.").
Mr. Woody's age and health do not appear to significantly affect his
present earning abilities. However, these circumstances are also relevant to
whether his current situation is likely to continue or improve, a factor we
consider next.
The bankruptcy court found that Mr. Woody's financial situation, though
stable now, is likely to deteriorate in the future due to his age and health
problems. This finding is supported by the evidence of Mr. Woody's ongoing
health issues related to his heart condition and the fact that he is rapidly
approaching typical retirement age.
We note, however, that Mr. Woody also conceded in his testimony that he
can "probably" expect to receive annual increases in his salary based on the
federal pay scale for "the next couple of years at least," as well as annual cost-of-living increases
for as long as he remains at his I.R.S. position. Thus, while his
long-term financial outlook remains uncertain, Mr. Woody can at least anticipate
a stable or even increased salary in the immediate future.
Mr. Woody's financial outlook has already improved in another important
sense: his accrued debt of over $53,000 from his 523 loans was discharged by the
bankruptcy court, a decision that has not been appealed and is now final. We
regard this discharge as a significant factor in assessing Mr. Woody's financial
future, since it eliminated more than three-quarters of his educational debt. Mr.
Woody now faces much less daunting payments than he would have if he was
required to repay his entire debt.(7)
See Smitley, 347 F.3d at 123 (holding that the
fact that "Smitley's financial condition has improved because he has received a
discharge of other debts" weighed in favor of nondischarge of his HEAL loan
obligations).
Viewed on a general level, we are inclined to agree with the bankruptcy
court that Mr. Woody has maintained a reasonably frugal lifestyle and cannot be
faulted for living extravagantly in the face of his mounting educational loan debt.
However, to comport with the strict standard for discharge of HEAL loans under
292f(g)'s unconscionability test, we "must necessarily be unforgivingly critical
in [our] assessment of the debtor's claimed expenses." In re Rice, 78 F.3d at
1151. Casting a careful eye over Mr. Woody's budget, we cannot help but
conclude that he currently makes monthly payments -- and, in some cases, has
been making these payments for many years -- that are unnecessary to satisfy his
basic living needs. We do not include Mr. Woody's expenditures on, for
example, "recreation/entertainment," or "cable/satellite/internet" as unnecessary
expenses; we agree with the bankruptcy court that people are not "robots" and
require at least minimal opportunity for recreation and relaxation. Even so, we
agree with the DOJ that certain of Mr. Woody's expenses are not so necessary as
to take precedence over his obligation to repay his HEAL loan obligation.
First and foremost, Mr. Woody's budget includes $125 expended each
month for rental of a storage space in which he stores furniture and office
equipment. Mr. Woody claims to have rented this storage space since
approximately 1990, and he conceded at his hearing that he has not used the
furniture or equipment in storage since that time. He also conceded that the
items in storage were worth "very little," and that the only reason he kept the
items in storage was "because it takes a certain amount of effort to clean [the
storage unit] out and get rid of it." By any standard, this expense is entirely
unnecessary; had Mr. Woody simply disposed of his unused furniture in 1990, he
could have been contributing the monthly rental expense to his student loan debt
instead and could have paid off a significant portion of his educational loan
obligations.(8) This single expense therefore
indicates that Mr. Woody's income,
even before he obtained steady employment at the I.R.S., allowed for at least
some repayment of his education loan debt without infringing upon his standard
of living.
A second category of monthly expense that has been unnecessary to Mr.
Woody's maintenance of a minimal standard of living is his contribution to his
retirement savings accounts. To be sure, we agree with the principle that saving
for one's retirement is a laudable goal that should generally be encouraged.
However, we also agree with the many other courts that have held that, in the
context of bankruptcy proceedings, retirement contributions should not take
precedence over repayment of preexisting debts. "Voluntary contributions to
retirement plans . . . are not reasonably necessary for a debtor's maintenance or
support and must be made from disposable income. . . . [A]lthough investments
may be financially prudent, they certainly are not necessary expenses for the
support of the debtors or their dependents. Investments of this nature are
therefore made with disposable income; disposable income is not what is left
after they are made." In re Anes, 195 F.3d 177, 180-81 (3d Cir. 1999); accord
In
re Harshbarger, 66 F.3d 775, 778 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[I]t would be unfair to the
creditors to allow the Debtors in the present case to commit part of their earnings
to the payment of their own retirement fund while at the same time paying their
creditors less than a 100% dividend." (quotation omitted)); In re Perkins, 318
B.R. 300, 306-07 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2004) (holding that "401(k) contributions
generally are not regarded as reasonably necessary for the support or maintenance
of a debtor and thus may be considered as available income from which a debtor
seeking a 523(a)(8) undue hardship discharge could use to repay an educational
loan" and collecting supporting cases).
Mr. Woody's 2005 budget included $210 per month in pre-tax
contributions to his 401(k) retirement plan. In addition, he budgeted $85 per
month towards repayment of a $2,500 thrift savings plan ("TSP") loan which he
had obtained in the year prior to his loan discharge hearing; Mr. Woody
explained that he took out the TSP loan in order to place more money in his IRA
accounts in order to benefit from the increased investment flexibility in those
accounts, a decision that was entirely discretionary on his part. Thus, between
these two expenses, Mr. Woody pays $295 per month towards voluntary
retirement contributions. While these payments will no doubt benefit Mr. Woody
in the long run, they represent expenses that should not have taken precedence
over his obligation to repay his HEAL loan.
In addition, we note that there are other sundry expenses in Mr. Woody's
monthly budget that, while perhaps individually de minimis, nevertheless appear
unnecessary to maintenance of his standard of living. For example, Mr. Woody
testified that he voluntarily pays approximately $26 per month for additional life
insurance beyond that provided by his employer, yet he has no dependents or
spouse to benefit from such additional insurance. He pays $26 per month in
union dues, though he is not required to belong to a union as part of his work.
He budgets $25 each month towards charitable contributions. And finally, Mr.
Woody's 2006 estimated budget predicted a monthly surplus of $79 after paying
all budgeted expenses -- income that is earmarked for no particular purpose and,
thus, could certainly be used to make payments towards his HEAL loan debt.
The bankruptcy court similarly concluded that several of Mr. Woody's
monthly expenses were unnecessary to maintenance of his standard of living.
However, the court also found that Mr. Woody's estimates of many of his
necessary expenses were "unrealistically low," and that the true cost of living
would eventually force Mr. Woody to redirect his income towards these necessary
expenses. For example, the court noted that Mr. Woody had not budgeted for
"miscellaneous expenses or unexpected health care expenses," nor had he
factored in the likelihood that he would need to replace his aging vehicle in the
future. According to the bankruptcy court, "[r]aising Mr. Woody's unrealistically
low estimated expenses to realistic levels will ultimately deprive him of the
ability to continue making payments toward voluntary expenses that are
unnecessary for him to maintain his minimal, if not meager, lifestyle."
We do not dispute the bankruptcy court's finding that Mr. Woody may
have underestimated some of his expenses. As part of the "unforgivingly
critical" assessment of a HEAL loan debtor's expenses, In re Rice, 78 F.3d at
1151, the court was required to carefully examine Mr. Woody's budget, including
whether it realistically represented his actual needs. And it is of course well
established that the court has the ability to take judicial notice of such verifiable
facts as the rising price of gasoline. See York v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 95
F.3d 948, 958 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Judicial notice is appropriate where a matter is
verifiable with certainty." (quotation omitted)). Thus, the bankruptcy court's
finding that Mr. Woody's budget failed to include likely future expenses was
within the purview of the court's analysis and was not clearly erroneous.
However, we differ with the bankruptcy court over the effect of this
finding on the unconscionability analysis. While Mr. Woody's budget may fail to
account for future changes in his expenses -- an important factor to note -- the
fact remains that through at least the time of the bankruptcy proceeding, Mr.
Woody managed to maintain his standard of living while making the payments
discussed above that we deem unnecessary. For example, though Mr. Woody
experienced some very lean years when his income was only a fraction of what it
is now, he has nevertheless managed to set aside enough money each month since
1990 to pay the rent for a space to store his unused furniture. Thus, although we
agree that Mr. Woody's budget indicates that he is likely to face increased
financial strain in the future, we also interpret it as evidence that to date, he has
earned sufficient income to have made significant payments on his HEAL loan
obligations, had he chosen to do so. In other words, the fact that Mr. Woody may
find himself in financial trouble in the future does not erase the fact that, in the
present and the past, his income and standard of living permitted him to make
loan payments.
The final factor we consider is one to which the bankruptcy court gave
great weight: Mr. Woody's good faith efforts to repay his HEAL loan
obligations. We agree that a debtor's good faith efforts at repayment over the life
of his loans are an important part of an unconscionability analysis. However,
unlike the bankruptcy court, we conclude that the record demonstrates that
despite Mr. Woody's ability to make at least minimal payments, he made almost
no effort to do so. Thus, we cannot conclude that he has acted in good faith
regarding his HEAL loan obligations.
The bankruptcy court acknowledged that Mr. Woody's total contribution
towards repayment of his HEAL loan was a single payment of $484.48, made in
1987. The court also noted that Mr. Woody never participated in any kind of
repayment program, making only "sporadic" attempts to initiate conversations
with loan representatives that never resulted in any concrete progress towards
repayment. Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court concluded that Mr. Woody had
acted in good faith because his failure to meet his loan obligations was not borne
of any desire to abuse the system: "despite reasonable efforts on his part, he was
unable to earn income sufficient to reasonably warrant any attempt at repayment."
Thus, the court concluded, "[t]he equities of this case weigh in favor of Mr.
Woody's good faith, and this Court will not condemn him because he is unable to
afford repayment of the obligation despite his best efforts."
However, the fact that Mr. Woody is likely to encounter increased
expenses into the future does not change the fact that, in the past as well as at
present, he could have applied income towards his educational loans rather than,
for example, furniture storage. Had Mr. Woody applied $125 per month since
1990 to loan payments rather than furniture storage, he would have shown a
significant effort to repay his educational loan debts.
Under these circumstances, we do not agree that Mr. Woody's minimal
efforts to repay his HEAL loan constitute good faith. The Rice and Smitley
courts define the good faith inquiry as focusing in relevant part upon "the
debtor's financial situation over the course of time when payments were due,"
and "the debtor's voluntary undertaking of additional financial burdens despite
his knowledge of his outstanding HEAL debt." In re Rice, 78 F.3d at 1150;
Smitley, 347 F.3d at 118. Here, Mr. Woody's financial situation since his HEAL
loan payments began to come due would have permitted some contribution
towards this obligation, yet Mr. Woody instead chose to make voluntary
payments towards other expenses. Thus, the bankruptcy court's finding that Mr.
Woody endeavored to repay his loan obligation in good faith is clearly erroneous.
The above factors paint a picture of Mr. Woody as a man who has
struggled to earn a decent income for much of his life, but who has in recent
years found employment that utilizes his skills and provides him with a
reasonable income. He has lived a relatively frugal existence, but has also
chosen to devote a portion of his income to certain expenses that were not
necessary to maintain his standard of living. While he was aware of the
significant debts he had accrued in educational loans, he made very little effort to
address these obligations and has effectively allowed them to languish for more
than two decades. Mr. Woody no longer need worry about the majority of these
loans, as $53,000 in 523 loan debt -- more than three-quarters of his total
educational loan obligation -- has already been discharged in bankruptcy. Mr.
Woody now finds himself approaching retirement age, making a decent income
for the time being but concerned about his lack of retirement savings and the
potential for expensive health problems in the future. He therefore requests that
we affirm the bankruptcy court's discharge of his remaining HEAL loan debt of
approximately $18,750.
Under these circumstances -- in particular, Mr. Woody's present level of
income and his lack of effort to make payments toward his educational loans
despite the apparent availability of funds from which he could have done so --
nondischarge of his HEAL loan debt would not be "excessive" or "exorbitant,"
nor would it "[lie] outside the limits of what is reasonable or acceptable," or be
"shockingly unfair, harsh, unjust," or "outrageous." While we do not doubt that
Mr. Woody faces financial difficulty in the future based on his age, health, and
lack of significant retirement savings, we cannot ignore the fact that he has
gained steady, full-time professional employment and yet has failed to confront in
good faith the obligation that he assumed when he accepted a HEAL loan, a
failure that persisted even as he put away money for his own retirement and
undertook voluntary expenses such as furniture storage, union membership,
charitable contributions, and excess life insurance. In enacting the strict
unconscionability standard for discharge of HEAL loan obligations, Congress
"intended to severely restrict the circumstances under which a HEAL loan could
be discharged in bankruptcy." In re Rice, 78 F.3d at 1148. We do not think that
Congress intended the discharge provision in 292f(g) to allow a debtor to spend
decades without making loan payments, even after having worked full time for
several years, then to receive a discharge of his HEAL loan obligations because
his health begins to fail as he approaches retirement age.
We therefore hold that the totality of Mr. Woody's circumstances do not
indicate that nondischarge of his HEAL loan debt would be unconscionable. The
BAP thus erred in affirming the bankruptcy court's discharge of this debt under
292f(g). We REVERSE the bankruptcy court's and the BAP's judgments and
order Mr. Woody's outstanding HEAL loan obligation reinstated.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we hold
that Mr. Woody's circumstances do not
satisfy the strict unconscionability standard for discharge of HEAL loan
obligations under 292f(g). The BAP's opinion affirming the bankruptcy
court's discharge of Mr. Woody's HEAL loan debt is therefore REVERSED, and
Mr. Woody's outstanding obligation on this debt is reinstated. This matter is
REMANDED to the BAP with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1.While 523 loans can be used to pay for
educational expenses in any field,
see 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8)(A), (B), HEAL loans are available only for educational
expenses incurred in the pursuit of a degree in the field of health or medicine,
such as a chiropractic degree. See 42 U.S.C. 292o(1).
2.Figures for Mr. Woody's earnings and his
budget are quoted from the
bankruptcy court, which in turn gleaned the figures from "an overview of the
record and Mr. Woody's testimony, which the Court finds credible." In re
Woody, 335 B.R. 431, 436 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2005). Neither party contests these
figures.
3.The bankruptcy court estimated Mr. Woody's
2005 and 2006 earnings,
since the court's opinion was issued just prior to the end of 2005.
4.Exactly how much Mr. Woody had
accumulated for retirement expenses is
unclear from the record, although the amount is unquestionably small. Mr.
Woody testified that his thrift savings plan ("TSP") account -- a type of
retirement savings account offered to federal employees -- held a balance of
approximately $7,500, and that he also held two IRA accounts -- one traditional
and one Roth IRA -- with balances of approximately $5,000 and $2,500,
respectively. However, in making its oral findings of fact, the bankruptcy
court
stated that it found Mr. Woody's retirement savings to be "in the $10,000 range."
The bankruptcy appellate panel, in contrast, stated Mr. Woody's retirement
accounts to be "worth approximately $3,000." For purposes of our analysis,
we
simply note that Mr. Woody has saved an amount incapable of supporting him
during his retirement.
5.42 U.S.C. 292f(f) requires the Secretary to
reduce federal
reimbursements or payments for health services to practicing health care
professionals who have defaulted on their HEAL loan obligations.
6.The bankruptcy court first announced its
findings and conclusions
verbally at the close of the July 12, 2005 hearing. At that time, the court
ordered
Mr. Woody's 523 loans discharged in their entirety, but ordered only the accrued
interest on his HEAL loan discharged, leaving the principal HEAL debt of
$4,700 still due. However, the court also "reserve[d] the right to write a
written
decision to more accurately reflect any additional findings of fact and
conclusions of law."
On December 15, 2005, the bankruptcy court exercised this reserved right
and issued a written order. The written order reiterated and expanded upon
the
court's previous findings of fact and most of its conclusions of law but amended
its judgment to order full discharge of both the principal and accrued on Mr.
Woody's HEAL loan, stating that "the nondischarge of any portion of Mr.
Woody's HEAL obligation would be unconscionable." The written order
represents the bankruptcy court's final judgment, and thus our summary focuses
on that order rather than the court's preliminary oral findings and conclusions.
7.The Rice and
Smitley courts considered the amount of educational loan
debt as a separate factor in their HEAL loan discharge analyses. See In re Rice,
78 F.3d at 1149; Smitley, 347 F.3d at 123. In our analysis of Mr. Woody's
circumstances, however, we believe that the amount of outstanding loan debt is
most important insofar as it affects his future prospects, and therefore we include
it here as an element of whether his situation is likely to improve.
8.The record does not indicate whether the cost
of Mr. Woody's storage unit
has been $125 per month since 1990, or whether that expense has increased with
time. Regardless, however, it represents a significant amount of income that
could have been directed towards repayment of Mr. Woody's loans without
affecting his standard of living in the slightest.
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