|RODNEY JAROME BROADES,||
Before BRORBY, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Rodney Jarome Broades, a state inmate appearing pro se, appeals the district court's decision denying his federal habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We deny Mr. Broades' request for a certificate of appealability and dismiss his appeal.
In his § 2254 petition, Mr. Broades challenged his state sentence for robbery by firearm, after former conviction of two or more felonies. The district court issued an Order denying Mr. Broades' petition as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). In making this determination, the district court applied the mail box rule and the one-year limitation period for bringing a § 2254 action, as well as tolled the one-year limitation period during the pendency of Mr. Broades' direct appeal and first state post-conviction application. The district court further determined no additional tolling occurred during the pendency of Mr. Broades' "Motion for [Order] Nunc Pro Tunc" and second post-conviction habeas petition in which he claimed the state incorrectly enhanced his conviction with prior underlying convictions. In addressing Mr. Broades' "Motion for [Order] Nunc Pro Tunc" and second state post-conviction petition, the district court noted the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found the issue he presented barred by the doctrine of res judicata. It also found the motion barred under Oklahoma law that requires any challenge to a conviction and sentence be brought pursuant to Oklahoma's Post-Conviction Procedure Act.
On appeal, Mr. Broades continues to claim his "Motion for [Order] Nunc Pro Tunc" and second state post-conviction petition should toll his limitation period under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2). We review de novo the legal basis for the district court's dismissal of Mr. Broades' § 2254 petition. See Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1453 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1235 (1996). In so doing, we afford deference to the state court's construction of state law. See James v. Gibson, 211 F.3d 543, 549 (10th Cir. 2000).
Applying this standard, we have carefully reviewed the record on appeal, Mr. Broades' brief, and the district court's order. We hold Mr. Broades untimely filed his federal habeas petition. In so holding, we are convinced Mr. Broades' "Motion for [Order] Nunc Pro Tunc" and second state post-conviction petition may not toll the limitation period under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2), for the reasons discussed below.
First, it is important to note that in considering Mr. Broades' "Motion for
[Order] Nunc Pro Tunc," the state district court issued an order clarifying it
enhanced Mr. Broades' sentence on the basis of at least two prior convictions.
Moreover, in addressing this same issue on appeal, on rehearing, in the second
state post-conviction petition, and in various other pleadings filed by Mr.
Broades, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals clearly found Mr. Broades'
claim barred under the doctrine of res judicata.(1)
In this case, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals repeatedly applied the doctrine of res judicata in barring Mr. Broades' claim the state district court improperly enhanced his sentence with his two prior convictions.(2)
Thus, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals disposed of Mr. Broades' claim on adequate and independent state grounds, and federal review is barred unless he can demonstrate cause for his default and actual prejudice as a result, or fundamental miscarriage of justice. In this vein, Mr. Broades alleges "cause" for his procedural default because "new information" showed the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not take "proper notice" of the number of his prior convictions either on direct appeal or in its order affirming denial of state post-conviction relief. We conclude Mr. Broades fails to show the requisite cause for his state procedural default. Specifically, Mr. Broades fails to show that on appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not consider the actual number of convictions used to enhance his sentence. To the contrary, the record shows the Oklahoma court repeatedly considered and rejected Mr. Broades' argument the district court improperly applied two prior convictions in calculating his sentence. As to its order affirming the denial of the first state post-convictioni relief, the court refused to consider the issue on res judicata grounds. In any event, the district court tolled the period in which Mr. Broades' first request for state post-conviction relief was pending. As to the second post-conviction petition, the state courts again refused to consider the prior conviction issue on res judicata grounds. In addition, the state district court pointed out Mr. Borades' second post-conviction petition constituted Mr. Broades' fifth legal challenge to his sentence and was frivolous. Under these circumstances, we conclude the district court did not err in failing to toll the limitation period during the pendency of either his "Motion for [Order] Nunc Pro Tunc" or his second state post-conviction petition on res judicata grounds.
Finally, Mr. Broades' conclusory statement that this court's failure to further toll his limitation period "would be a grave miscarriage of justice" is insufficient to meet the miscarriage of justice exception. The "fundamental miscarriage of justice" burden is satisfied only if Mr. Broades produces facts amounting to a "colorable showing of factual innocence." Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986). While the state enhanced Mr. Broades' sentence on the basis of two underlying convictions, he has not attempted to show he is factually innocent of those prior convictions.
In order for this court to grant a certificate of appealability, Mr. Broades must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). He fails to make the requisite showing. Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, and substantially the same reasons set forth in the district court's May 4, 2000 Order, we deny Mr. Broades' request for a certificate of appealability, deny his October 11, 2000 "Motion for Leave to File Judicial Notice," and DISMISS his appeal.
Entered by the Court:
United States Circuit Judge
*. This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1. Res judicata is a substantive form of default, unlike default based on a pure filing requirement. See Habteselassie v. Novak, 209 F.3d 1208, 1210-11 (10th Cir. 2000). Consequently, res judicata may preclude a state court from granting relief on the merits and does not require a "properly filed" analysis by this court in Habteselassie. Id.
2. In one order the court held the motion was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and also noted such a motion should not be treated as a post-conviction application under Oklahoma's Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Mr. Broades contends the Court of Criminal Appeals contradicted itself in another order dismissing his request for a rehearing when it stated it treated his "Motion to Clarify Order Nunc Pro Tunc" under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Even if the Oklahoma court treated the "Motion to Clarify Order Nunc Pro Tunc" as a second post-conviction application, it nevertheless found his claim barred under the doctrine of res judicata because Mr. Broades raised the same underlying enhancement issue in his direct appeal and first post-conviction application. Thus, regardless of whether his motion is considered a collateral attack under § 2254, the Oklahoma court's res judicata determination would apply as a procedural bar. For these reasons, we deny Mr. Broades' October 11, 2000 "Motion for Leave to File Judicial Notice," in which he provides supplemental authority in support of this argument.